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Scoggins v. Unigard Insurance Co.12/31/1992
at statute must be liberally construed in light of its entire statutory scheme. Murphy v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 747 P.2d 691 (Colo. App. 1987).
Unigard concedes that, if it is assumed that each individual in the vehicle had a complying policy under the No-fault Act, then § 10-4-707(4) would render the parents' primary over the policy of the owner. However, under the interpretation advanced by Unigard, because of the fortuitous event that the owner of the vehicle was not insured, no coverage for PIP benefits is available to Scoggins. Further, under Unigard's interpretation, one of the purposes of the No-Fault Act - assuring that accident victims receive adequate compensation - is frustrated.
In interpreting a statute, our purpose is to determine the intent of the General Assembly. In light of the legislative purpose to avoid inadequate compensation to victims of automobile accidents, § 10-4-702, C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 4A), I conclude that the policy of Martinez' parents is the primary policy, albeit the only one, under the provisions of § 10-4-707(4) and that Scoggins is entitled to PIP benefits under that policy.
Thus, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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