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Waters v. Keelan11/23/1992
which someone pays monetary premiums. In that situation the concern of double recovery for a loss is lessened by the fact that the benefits were previously paid for by the person or by someone else on the person's behalf. The legislative Discussions, however, evince an intent that other types of benefits, such as "individually held disability and life insurance, social security benefits, death benefits, and maybe some unemployment benefits" also be excluded. See statement by Senator Hefley, supra. Furthermore, Senator Meiklejohn's statement that "things that you're paying for one way or the other. . . ought be deducted from a judgment," supra (emphasis added), reflects the view that the benefit need not be paid for monetarily to come within the exception. We therefore construe the clause as broad enough to cover contracts for which a plaintiff gives some form of consideration, whether it be in the form of money or employment services, with the expectation of receiving future benefits in the event they become payable under the contract.
We are satisfied that our construction of the statute comports with the statutory language and is consistent with the available expressions of legislative intent. In addition, it serves the purpose of protecting benefits to which a person is entitled by virtue of that person's own efforts. Because an employee exchanges something of value, his services, in return for an employment contract and its derivative benefits, benefit payments received as part of the compensation for these services are entitled to the same protection against offset that would apply to benefits received as a result of an insurance contract for which that person had paid money. See Riss & Co., 108 Colo. at 84, 114 P.2d at 281 (if a benefit plan is part of an employee's compensation, "then [the employee] bought and paid for such insurance as clearly as though he had purchased an accident policy"). Thus, even though Keelan provided services in exchange for his employment contract and paid no money for the employee benefits, we conclude that his right to receive the ensuing disability benefits was within the statute's exception clause.
The trial court also found that Keelan's disability benefits were paid "as a result of" his employment contract with the City. Even though the State provided the funding, the court determined that the benefit recipients had negotiated for the Plan and considered it a part of their contract with the City. The right to receive pension benefits is contractual in nature and arises out of the employer-employee relationship. This is true in systems where an employee pays for the benefit by way of salary deductions, Police Pension and Relief Bd. v. McPhail, 139 Colo. 330, 338 P.2d 694 (1959), as well as in those systems that are funded by legislative appropriations, In re Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47, 48, 51 (Colo. 1988) (in the context of a system where an employee's retirement benefits were funded by congressional appropriations, we stated that "since pension benefits represent a form of deferred compensation for services rendered, the employee's right to such benefits is a contractual right, derived from the terms of the employment contract"). See also Colorado Springs Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Colorado Springs, 784 P.2d 766, 770 (Colo. 1989) ("Rights which accrue under a pension plan are contractual obligations which are protected under article II, section 11, of the Colorado Constitution and article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution . . . . Pension plans prom
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