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Sheryll Nation v. Colla9/26/1991
t so egregious that a denial of qualified immunity was justified. The question before us is whether Colla's conduct in this investigation was objectively reasonable. Any possible subjective bad faith Colla may have had, although certainly unacceptable, is irrelevant. As previously noted, the public interest in deterring unlawful conduct is adequately protected by an objective test of the reasonableness of a caseworker's conduct.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Nations and giving them all reasonable inferences, we hold, as a matter of law, that Colla did not violate any clearly established statutory or constitutional right under the attendant circumstances. Viewed objectively, James was a two-month old baby with an unexplained broken leg who was being treated with a large immobilizing cast. The circumstances suggested the possibility of physical child abuse. Colla, as a CPS caseworker, was attempting to determine whether such abuse had occurred and was maintaining the status quo pending the completion of her investigation. We conclude that Colla's conduct prior to the time a dependency petition was filed did not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable CPS caseworker would have known. Further, assuming that cases exist where the conduct complained of is so egregious so as to justify the denial of qualified immunity, we conclude that Colla's conduct in the present case was not so egregious so as to justify the denial of qualified immunity. Colla was entitled to qualified immunity for her activities prior to the filing of the dependency petition. Accordingly, since Colla's conduct and activities were subject to an unbroken chain of qualified and absolute immunity, the judgment entered against Colla is reversed.
Before concluding this discussion on the appeal and moving on to the cross-appeal, it is appropriate to discuss the dissenting opinion. The dissent disagrees with the majority's conclusion that the Ninth Circuit's approach best suits the public policy reasons underlying the granting of absolute immunity. The basis for this disagreement is the dissent's premise that existing state legislation recognizes only qualified immunity. A.R.S. § 8-546.04(A) provides:
Any person making a complaint, or providing information or otherwise participating in the program authorized by this article [child protective services] shall be immune from any civil or criminal liability by reason of such action, unless such person acted with malice.. . . (emphasis added).
There are a number of reasons to reject this dissenting premise. Initially, we note that this argument is raised for the first time on appeal. Nowhere in the trial court did the appellees present the argument that Colla's immunities in a federal rights action are limited by a state immunity statute. The issue should not be decided for the first time on appeal. Campbell v. Warren, 151 Ariz. 207, 208, 726 P.2d 623, 624 (App. 1986). However, even on the merits the argument should be rejected. Federal law controls the substantive issues in a federal civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The same argument now advanced on appeal was considered and rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980). After determining in Martinez that there was no merit to the contention that California's immunity statute was unconstitutional when applied to defeat a tort claim under state law, the Supreme Court expressly stated that "it is clear that the California immunity statute does not control this claim [§ 1983 claim] even thoug
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Arizona Personal Injury Attorneys
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