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Swichtenberg v. Brimer9/19/1991
r of the public, to visit his residence. Brimer was not performing as host to a social event or in any other non-employer role. He directed Swichtenberg to his place of residence to perform work for which Swichtenberg would be paid. No relationship other than employer-employee predominated between the parties at the time Swichtenberg's cause of action arose. No other persona was present.
Similar conclusions have been reached by courts in other jurisdictions. In Royster v. Montanez, 134 Cal.App.3d 362, 184 Cal.Rptr. 560 (1982), plaintiff, a secretary and girl "Friday" in defendant's business, went to defendant's private residence to consult with him about the payment of a utility bill owed by the business. As plaintiff left defendant's home, she stepped into a hole and was injured. In rejecting plaintiff's dual capacity arguments, the California Court of Appeals stated: " e conclude that defendant's liability at law cannot be premised upon the unsafe condition of his residence which premises became plaintiff's place of employment by virtue of her errand." (Emphasis supplied.) Id. 184 Cal.Rptr. at 566.
In the instant case, it is noted that the area of the skylight did not become plaintiff's place of employment by an extension theory. By virtue of B & B's maintenance contract with the homeowners association, the premises were in fact the work site both at the time the skylight was constructed and at the time of plaintiff's injury .
Jansen v. Harmon, 164 N.W.2d 323 (Iowa 1969) presented a similar situation. Plaintiff, an employee at defendant's auto-parts store, was directed by defendant to go to an apartment building owned by defendant to obtain some items belonging to the auto-parts store. Plaintiff was injured when a wooden post fell down the elevator shaft as he was standing on the freight elevator. In holding that Workers' Compensation Act provided plaintiff's exclusive remedy, the Iowa Supreme Court observed:
Louie Katzman, possessor of the Booth [apartment] building . . ., is not a distinct and separate entity from Jansen's employer, Louie Katzman who conducts business under the trade name National Auto Parts Company. As owner of the building he is not a person other than Jansen's employer against whom plaintiffs may maintain an action as contemplated by section 85.22.
Id. at 328. The Iowa court quoted the following from Williams v. Hartshorn, 296 N.Y. 49, 69 N.E.2d 557 (1946).
Regardless of his status as owner of the premises where the injury occurred, an employer remains an employer in his relations with his employees as to all matters arising from and connected with their employment. He may not be treated as a dual legal personality, 'a sort of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.'
Jansen at 328.
Likewise, an employee who was injured while working on the roof of a house owned by his employer, and who obtained recovery under the Workers' Compensation Act, could not maintain an action against the owner employer for alleged violation of the Structural Work Act. The court emphasized "the long standing prohibition against dual recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Structural Work Act against a single entity." Kim v. Raymond, 44 Ill.App.3d 37, at 38, 3 Ill.Dec. 34 at 35, 358 N.E.2d 34 at 35 (1976). See also Walker v. Berkshire Foods, Inc., 41 Ill.App.3d 595, 354 N.E.2d 626 (1976) and Schmid v. U.S., 826 F.2d 227 (3d Cir.1987).
The dissent traces "the trajectory of Brimer's negligence" leading to Swichtenberg's injury. This analysis, in our view, misses the mark. Brimer's alleged negligence in installing and maintaining the skylight cannot obscure his role as Swichtenberg's employer at the ti
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