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Seaward Construction Co. v. Bradley9/23/1991
ction 13-21-101. Id. We do not find the reasoning on which the court of appeals based its decision persuasive.
The fact that both punitive and compensatory damages are part of a single claim for relief tied to a single act of negligence lacks relevance to the question whether prejudgment interest is to be calculated on both components of a damages award. It does not alter the fact that the two types of damages are awarded for different purposes. As analyzed in previous sections of this opinion, we have long considered prejudgment interest to be awarded as compensation for the delay in payment of damages for an earlier-incurred injury . Under section 13-21-101, such damages may be incurred as the result of a tort involving either negligence or willful intent. The statute cannot be read to say that all damages of any kind, including punitive damages, stemming from a tort involving willful intent are to bear prejudgment interest. Absent an express indication of legislative intent to deviate from the principle that prejudgment interest is compensatory, we construe section 13-21-101(1) to limit the base upon which prejudgment interest is to be calculated to "damages for personal injuries sustained," i.e., compensatory damages.
In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals also rejected the trial court's reliance on Jacobs. Bradley, 797 P.2d at 752. In Jacobs the court of appeals held that prejudgment interest does not apply to punitive damages in a personal injury action, citing Coale v. Dow Chemical Co., 701 P.2d 885 (Colo. App. 1985). Jacobs, 738 P.2d at 13. The court of appeals in the present case noted that Coale based its conclusion that prejudgment interest does not apply to punitive damages on interpretation of section 5-12-102, 2 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.), a statute applicable to product liability actions and other proceedings not including personal injury . Bradley, 797 P.2d at 752. Thus, the court concluded that the extension of Coale in Jacobs to a personal injury action was erroneous. Id. We disagree. In Coale the court of appeals based its conclusion on the compensatory nature of prejudgment interest, not on the specific language of section 5-12-102. 701 P.2d at 890. We agree, therefore, with the reasoning of the court in Coale, and with the extension of that reasoning to construction of section 13-21-101, applicable to personal injury actions, in Jacobs. We conclude that the court of appeals erred in declining to follow Jacobs. See Bradley, 797 P.2d at 751.
IV.
We are persuaded that section 13-21-101 was enacted to ensure full compensation for loss resulting from personal injury . As an element of compensation, the prejudgment interest authorized does not apply to punitive damages. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and direct that the judgment of the district court be affirmed.
Disposition
JUDGMENT REVERSED.
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