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Meyer v. City of Des Moines9/18/1991
the legislature. See, e.g., Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill.2d 129, 132-35, 90 Ill.Dec. 950, 952, 483 N.E.2d 268, 270 (1985); Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471, 498-500, 610 P.2d 668, 683 (1980); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 62 (Okla.1976).
In Law v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 147, 755 P.2d 1135 (1988), the court attempted to refute these reasons. The court noted that over a lifetime it is almost certain that a motor vehicle accident will injure the average motorist. So the court reasoned that as a matter of public policy the law must recognize the responsibility of every person to anticipate and take reasonable measures against motor vehicle accidents. Id. at 151-52, 755 P.2d at 1140. The court concluded that the
ejection of the seat belt defense can no longer be based on the antediluvian doctrine that one need not anticipate the negligence of others. There is nothing to anticipate; the negligence of motorists is omnipresent.
Id.
The court then turned its focus to the duty concept and concluded it was incorrect to conceptualize the seat belt defense in terms of duty. It saw duty as the obligation to use care to avoid endangering others. In contrast, it saw nonuse of a seat belt not as "a failure to use care to avoid endangering others" but as "part of the related obligation to conduct oneself reasonably to minimize damages and avoid foreseeable harm to oneself." Id. at 153, 755 P.2d at 1141.
From that reasoning the court proceeded to challenge the proposition that the mitigation doctrine applies only to postaccident conduct and is inapplicable to events preceding the accident--"a time when plaintiffs supposedly had a right to assume that others would not act negligently." Id. The court believed that the common law concept of mitigation of damages or avoidable consequences has been modified by comparative fault which applies that doctrine to preaccident conduct. Id.
In support of its belief, the court noted that section 1(b) of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA), 12 U.L.A. 39-40 (Supp.1987) defined "fault" to include, among other things, "unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages." The court also noted that this definition provided that " egal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to contributory fault." Id. (emphasis added). The court pointed to a significant example in the official comment to section 1(b) of the UCFA:
As stated in the official comment to the UCFA, negligent failure to use a seat belt would reduce damages solely for those injuries directly attributable to the lack of seat belt restraint. Thus, as far as the calculation of damages is concerned, the comparative negligence statutes apply the doctrine of avoidable consequences to preaccident conduct.
Id.
In short, the court believed that
t least under the comparative fault statute, each person is under an obligation to act reasonably to minimize foreseeable injuries and damages. Thus, if a person chooses not to use an available, simple safety device, that person may be at "fault."
Id. at 155, 755 P.2d at 1143.
Finally, the court in Law took issue with the arguments that a seat belt defense would preempt the role of the legislature, would result in windfalls to tortfeasors, and would unduly complicate litigation. The court saw itself as having an obligation to participate "in the evolution of tort law so that it may reflect societal and technological changes." Id. at 156, 755 P.2d at 1144. This obligation, the court concluded, has "compelled it in some cases to recognize duties that
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