 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Pemco Insurance Co. v. Schlea9/24/1991
In February 1988, Michael Ray Evans abducted Gloria Schlea from her place of employment using an automobile taken from a co-worker. In the course of the abduction, Evans raped Schlea. Schlea's mother had insured her own car with Public Employees Mutual Insurance Company (PEMCO). The policy included household
members of the named insured as insureds under the policy. Schlea made a claim to PEMCO for payment of medical expenses and lost wages under the personal injury protection (PIP) portion of the automobile insurance policy. PEMCO brought a declaratory judgment action to determine its rights and liabilities under the policy. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered partial summary judgment, ruling that Gloria Schlea's status as an insured by virtue of her status as a member of her mother's household was a question of fact, but that if she was an insured, she was entitled to recover PIP benefits under the PEMCO policy. PEMCO appeals. We reverse.
[1-3] This court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court on appeal from summary judgment. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Summary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Wilson, 98 Wash. 2d at 437. Here, insurance coverage turns on our interpretation of insurance policy language; thus, we conduct a de novo review because such interpretation is a question of law. Roller v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 115 Wash. 2d 679, 682, 801 P.2d 207 (1990). We give the policy the same fair, reasonable, and sensible construction that would be given to the contract by the average person purchasing insurance. Sears v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 111 Wash. 2d 636, 638, 762 P.2d 1141 (1988).
Schlea's policy provides that it will extend PIP coverage and pay for medical expenses and loss of income resulting from bodily injury suffered in an "accident". The policy defines "accident" as "an unexpected and unintended occurrence
resulting from ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle or trailer." PEMCO argues that Schlea should not recover PIP benefits because she did not incur injuries in an "accident" that arose out of the "use" of the vehicle.
We apply the following criteria to determine whether an injury arose out of the "use" of a vehicle for insurance purposes:
(1) here must be a causal relation or connection between the injury and the use of the insured vehicle; (2) the person asserting coverage must be in a reasonably close geographic proximity to the insured vehicle, although the person need not be actually touching it; (3) the person must be vehicle oriented rather than highway or sidewalk oriented at the time; and (4) the person must also be engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the vehicle at the time.
(Citation omitted.) Roller v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 115 Wash. 2d at 687.
[5, 6] Here, only criteria 1 and 4 are reasonably in dispute. Regarding criterion 1, the "connection" between the use and the injury requires that the vehicle or its permanent attachments causally contribute in some way toward the production of the injury. Transamerica Ins. Group v. United P. Ins. Co., 92 Wash. 2d 21, 26, 593 P.2d 156 (1979).
The fact that the vehicle is the "mere 'situs'" of an accident does not bring the occurrence within the coverage of the policy. Transamerica Ins. Group,
Page 1 2 Washington Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|