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Sidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann Inc.9/5/1991
te:
The purpose of the statute of limitations is to compel actions to be commenced within what the legislature deemed to be a reasonable time, and not postponed indefinitely. However, the statute's operation could be tolled for what the legislature regarded as a good reason. . . .
(Italics ours.) Summerrise v. Stephens, 75 Wash. 2d 808, 812, 454 P.2d 224 (1969). Strictly speaking, any tolling statute "effectively negate the purpose of a statute of limitations". Here, the Legislature could well have reasoned that plaintiffs in multidefendant actions should receive this extra protection from the harsh effects of the statute of limitation. Moreover, the question of fairness raised by the Court of Appeals is a 2-edged sword. It is arguably unfair to require a plaintiff to serve all defendants within a set limitation period, when it may be difficult or impossible to determine the actual location of some defendants before discovery is underway. Statutes of limitation are procedural rules that are properly the realm of the Legislature,
and the fairness of such statutes should generally be left to the Legislature to determine.
Amicus Washington Defense Trial Lawyers Association argues that RCW 4.16.170, literally read, is unconstitutional because it creates a "new legislative class" of "named but unserved defendants" who are denied the benefit of the statute of limitation. We reject this interpretation. The statute creates no new class of defendants. Every legal entity has an equal likelihood of being either the defendant that is served in a given case or one of the defendants that is not served. Moreover, each defendant must still be served, and thus given actual notice, before any action can be taken concerning it; no recognizable rights are abridged.
Respondents assert there is no valid reason to distinguish between named and unnamed defendants for purposes of the tolling statute. That issue is not, however, part of this case. All defendants were named. It has been argued that plaintiffs might attempt to evade the name requirement by naming numerous "John Doe" defendants but only serving one easy target such as the State, resulting in what arguably might be considered an abuse of process. There is no such abuse here and, therefore, a ruling on this issue can await another time. We note, however, that in some cases, if identified with reasonable particularity, "John Doe" defendants may be appropriately "named" for purposes of RCW 4.16.170.
RCW 4.16.170 is unambiguous. The Court of Appeals is reversed. To the extent statements in North St. Ass'n v. Olympia, 96 Wash. 2d 359, 367, 635 P.2d 721 (1981) ("upon filing a writ within the [relevant] period, the applicant has an additional 90 days to serve all necessary parties") and Patrick v. DeYoung, 45 Wash. App. 103, 107, 724 P.2d 1064 (1986) (" n order to complete the commencement of the action as to any defendant, the plaintiff must serve that defendant . . . within 90 days from the date of the
filing of the complaint"), review denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1023 (1987) conflict with this decision, they are disapproved.
Disposition
Holding that service upon one defendant tolled the statute of limitation as to the remaining named defendants, the court reverses the decisions of the Court of Appeals.
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