 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Eagle-Picher Industries Inc. v. Balbos8/29/1990
2 until his disability retirement in 1972. In
that year, he ceased regular smoking, having been a habitual smoker since his teen years, but he occasionally smoked a cigarette thereafter. Lockwood was diagnosed as having asbestosis in 1979.
One of the defendant manufacturers in Lockwood, Raymark Industries, Inc. (Raymark), argued that evidence of its knowledge of the dangers of asbestos which it acquired after Lockwood's retirement was irrelevant because, it contended, there was no continuing duty to warn Lockwood of the dangers of asbestos after he was no longer exposed to the product. In concluding that evidence of Raymark's post-1972 knowledge was relevant, the Supreme Court of Washington stated:
We believe that where a person's susceptibility to the danger of a product continues after that person's direct exposure to the product has ceased, the manufacturer still has a duty after exposure to exercise reasonable care to warn the person of known dangers, if the warning could help to prevent or lessen the harm. Such a warning should be required to the extent practicable. Thus, it will depend on the circumstances if a warning to previous users of the product must be made by direct personal contact with such users. Alternative warning methods which may be reasonable in a given situation might include notices to physicians or advertisements.
In this case, in view of the expert testimony at trial that asbestos remains in the lungs long after exposure and that cigarette smoking aggravates asbestosis, we believe that if Raymark had made a reasonable effort to provide Lockwood with the information it acquired about the dangers of asbestos exposure after his retirement, the seriousness of his injury might have been reduced. Under these circumstances, Raymark had a continuing duty to warn Lockwood of the known dangers of its product after he was no longer exposed to it . . . .
744 P.2d at 619.
The appellants in the case before us, including Eagle-Picher, owed a similar duty to exercise reasonable care to
warn Balbos and Knuckles of the dangers of asbestos long after the two men had their last mesothelioma-producing exposures. As appellees correctly point out, if the decedents had been apprised of the dangers to their health, they might have sought medical treatment sooner and thus, perhaps, prolonged their lives.
The trial court's decision not to use the word "bystanders" in its duty to warn instruction, as Eagle-Picher had requested, also did not constitute reversible error. We recognize that there is a difference between the words "bystander" and "user." We also realize that the evidence clearly showed that the decedents were bystanders. The trial judge, therefore, would have been better advised to instruct the jury on the duty that manufacturers owe to such bystanders. As it turns out, however, the judge's failure to use the proper word made no difference. We explain.
We note that manufacturers are no longer liable for negligence only to users and consumers of their products. They also are liable to those whom the manufacturer should expect to be endangered by the products' probable use. W. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 100, at 703 (5th ed. 1984) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 395 (1965)). "There is no longer any doubt that the negligence liability extends to any lawful use of the thing supplied, as well as to a mere bystander . . . ." Id. See also Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 554, 332 A.2d 11(1975) (cologne
manufacturer was negligent in failing to place on cologne bottle a warning that cologne was highly f
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|