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Eagle-Picher Industries Inc. v. Balbos8/29/1990
lammable; manufacturer liable to bystander burned when her friend poured cologne on burning candle).
Because Eagle-Picher and the other defendants owed the same duty to bystanders such as Balbos and Knuckles as they owed to users of their products, it made no difference that the trial judge spoke of "persons whom [a manufacturer'] reasonably expected to use the product," rather than "persons whom a manufacturer reasonably expected to be bystanders near where the product was used."
We also observe that the jury had heard weeks of testimony clearly showing that the two decedents did not actually handle, or "use," the asbestos-containing products. It would have been obvious to anyone in the courtroom that Balbos and Knuckles were "bystanders." It was clear that the persons to whom appellants owed, or did not owe, a duty to warn were the decedents, not some unnamed "users" of the products. As Chief Judge Stedman Prescott opined in Hartman v. Meadows, 243 Md. 158, 220 A.2d 555(1966):
The average jury of today is composed of intelligent people. For the main part, they generally know and understand what is going on in a trial, and realize the purport of the judge's charge. It is unnecessary, in order not to be misleading or confusing, for the court to set forth in minute detail the limitations of every conceptual interpretation that might be placed upon his charge. The purpose of oral charges is to tell the jury in simple words what the law is in the case before them, and we will not be too particular in criticizing the words used if the result be sufficient. Lloyd v. Yellow Cab Co., 220 Md. 488 [154 A.2d 906][(1959)].
Id. at 163, 220 A.2d 555. See also Lundgren v. Ferno-Washington Co., 80 Md. App. 522, 531, 565 A.2d 335(1989). The result of the trial judge's instruction was sufficient.
Finally, we observe that counsel for Eagle-Picher did not mention the distinction between the terms "user" and "bystander" during the arguments surrounding the motions for judgment and the renewed motions for judgment. It appears that Eagle-Picher did not deem the distinction worthy of mention until after the jury instructions had been given.
We perceive no error in the trial court's refusal to give either the failure to warn instruction or the punitive damages instruction that Eagle-Picher requested.
9.
The trial court erred in failing to give appellants' requested instructions on the sophisticated user and superseding cause defenses.
Appellants Owens-Illinois and Pittsburgh Corning manufactured asbestos-containing products and sold them to Bethlehem Steel. They were defendants in the Knuckles case. Appellants ACandS and Porter Hayden installed asbestos-containing products at Bethlehem Steel shipyards. ACandS was a defendant in the Knuckles case while Porter Hayden was a defendant in both the Balbos and Knuckles cases. The appellants contend that the trial court erred in failing to give appellants' requested instructions on the sophisticated purchaser and superseding cause defenses.
Sophisticated Purchaser
The sophisticated purchaser defense relieves a supplier of its duty to give direct warnings to the employees of a purchaser, when the giving of such direct warnings is not feasible and the purchaser knows of the dangers posed by the use of the supplier's product in the workplace. The appellants allege that Bethlehem Steel was a sophisticated or knowledgeable industrial purchaser aware of the dangers associated with the use of asbestos-containi
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