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Eagle-Picher Industries Inc. v. Balbos8/29/1990
no evidence that the employees of the installers ever saw Bethlehem Steel take any precautions to protect Bethlehem Steel employees when the installers were working in the area. The appellants offered no evidence that they apprised Bethlehem Steel of the dangers, attempted to ascertain whether Bethlehem Steel could reasonably be relied upon to disseminate information about the dangers, or even in fact did rely on Bethlehem Steel to provide warnings to their employees. But, assuming arguendo, the appellant had taken these actions, Restatement ยง 388 comment n provides in pertinent part that:
Giving to the third person through whom the chattel is supplied all the information necessary to its safe use is not in all cases sufficient to relieve the supplier from liability . . . .
Since the care which must be taken always increases with the danger involved, it may be reasonable to require those who supply through others chattels which if ignorantly
used involve grave risk of serious harm to those who use them . . . to take precautions to bring the information home to the users of such chattels which it would be unreasonable to demand were the chattels of a less dangerous character . . . . f the danger involved in the ignorant use of a particular chattel is very great, it may be that the supplier does not exercise reasonable care in entrusting the communication of the necessary information even to a person whom he has good reason to believe to be careful . . . . Where the danger involved in the ignorant use of their true quality is great and such means of disclosure are practicable and not unduly burdensome, it may well be that the supplier should be required to adopt them.
The ignorant use of asbestos-containing products posed grave threats to the life and health of the user and bystanders while the burden upon the appellant suppliers of providing warnings would not have been unduly burdensome.
In summary, as a result of balancing the comment n factors, appellants were not relieved of their duty to bring home to Bethlehem Steel employees the information they needed to protect their lives. We hold that under the facts in the instant case and the clear intent of section 388, the trial court did not err in refusing to give appellant's requested instruction on the sophisticated user defense.
Superseding Cause
Appellants contend that the evidence adduced at trial concerning Bethlehem Steel's actual knowledge and conduct with respect to the use of the asbestos-containing insulation products in its shipyards tends to show that Bethlehem Steel's conduct was a superseding cause of the decedents' injury and establish that Bethlehem Steel had the sole means and opportunity to warn and protect bystander employees. The appellant argues that the evidence was sufficient to create a jury question and, therefore, to require an instruction to the jury on the application of the superseding cause.
We disagree. A superseding cause instruction is appropriate "where there is reasonable room for disagreement whether the third party action [Bethlehem Steel's failure to warn] . . . was extraordinary and not foreseeable, or otherwise fits the legal definition of superseding cause." Van Buskirk, 760 F.2d at 496. As the Court of Appeals noted in Caroline v. Reicher, 269 Md. 125, 304 A.2d 831(1973),
We recognize that a determination of whether the intervening act of a third person is a superseding cause . . . may be a question for the trier of fact. But, when the evidence presented and the logical inferences deducible therefrom admit of but one conclusion, the question becomes one of la
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