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Eagle-Picher Industries Inc. v. Balbos8/29/1990
ted the decedents and effected a warning.
The general rule, as stated in the Restatement § 452, is that a third party's failure to prevent harm is not a superseding cause. See Restatement § 452(1). The exception to this rule is whether the burden has shifted to a third party because of "a lapse of time or otherwise." Restatement
§ 452(2). This exception is not met in this case because as articulated in Van Buskirk :
Where . . . a supplier is continually supplying a product with a latent defect in it, and the supplier has reason to know that sufficient precautions are not being taken with respect to the use of that product, there is no good reason, . . . to shift the duty to warn . . . . Where supply is continuous, there is no "lapse of time" that would justify shifting the duty.
760 F.2d at 497(citation omitted). Although the appellants argue that they were relieved of the duty to warn based on the sophisticated user doctrine, they do not appear to argue that they did not continuously supply Bethlehem Steel with asbestos-containing products over several years. We concluded above that the appellants had no reasonable basis for relying on Bethlehem Steel to act as a "conduit" for warning Bethlehem Steel employees and that the duty to warn did not shift to Bethlehem Steel.
We hold that failure of Bethlehem Steel to act to prevent harm to its employees threatened by the appellants' failure to warn was not a superseding cause. The intervening act or failure to warn by Bethlehem Steel was foreseeable and not extraordinary even if highly irresponsible. The appellant suppliers had an independent duty to warn of the latent dangers of their products and this duty did not shift to Bethlehem Steel.
10.
Plaintiffs failed to present legally sufficient evidence to establish that appellants' conduct was so egregious as to support an award of punitive damages.
In the Knuckles case, the jury assessed punitive damages against Eagle-Picher in the amount of $50,000 and against Owens-Illinois in the amount of $100,000. Wanton or reckless conduct, as opposed to actual malice, will suffice to support an award of punitive damages in a product liability action. American Laundry Mach. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 116, 412 A.2d 407(1980). Wanton and reckless
conduct, however, requires far more than mere negligence, or what may be causally inferred from it. Id. at 117, 412 A.2d 407. It requires direct evidence of substantial knowledge on the part of the manufacturer that the product is, or is likely to become, dangerous, and a gross indifference to that danger. Id. Under this standard, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant conducted himself in an extraordinary manner characterized by a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of others. Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 69 Md. App. 124, 516 A.2d 990(1986). See also R. Gilbert, P. Gilbert & R. Gilbert, Maryland Tort Law Handbook § 25.3.1 (1986). Appellants Eagle-Picher and Owens-Illinois contend that appellees have not presented any evidence that the appellants had substantial knowledge that the products at issue were dangerous and that there was a gross indifference to that danger.
Appellate courts of our sister states have had occasion to consider whether sufficient evidence was presented to hold various manufacturers of asbestos-containing products liable for punitive damages on the basis of their knowledge of the dangers of asbestos and their failure either to warn employees and customers or eliminate asbestos from their product. Because we are embark
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