Estep v. Georgetown Leather Design8/3/1990
or Credit Co., 261 Md. 278, 274 A.2d 345 (1971); Tedrow v. Ford Motor Co., 260 Md. 142, 271 A.2d 688 (1970). Such treatment does not deny the right of appeal. Rather, it regulates the time for taking the appeal in the interest of judicial economy. Lang, 267 Md. at 272, 297 A.2d at 738. It is precisely the question of timing that is at issue in the instant case.
In Billman v. Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund, 312 Md. 128, 538 A.2d 1172 (1988), we noted that the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article leaves it to the Maryland Rules to determine the date from which the time for appeal begins to run. In Billman, we held that Rule 2-601(b) fixes the date on which the time calculation begins as the "date on which the clerk makes a record of the judgment by 'writing on the file jacket, or on a docket within that file, or in a docket book.'" Id. at 134, 538 A.2d at 1175. That date is considered "the date of the judgment." Id.
We made clear in Houghton v. County Commissioners of Kent County, 307 Md. 216, 223-24, 513 A.2d 291, 294-95 (1986), that no specific words, such as "judgment," need be
used by the clerk in order to make a docket entry into a final judgment. Nevertheless, in Doehring v. Wagner, 311 Md. 272, 533 A.2d 1300 (1987), we held that when a trial court makes a ruling which "in substance does finally terminate that case in that court," an appeal could still not be taken until "that ruling becomes embodied in whatever formal action is necessary to constitute a final judgment." Id. at 274-75, 533 A.2d at 1301 (emphasis added).
Therefore, Respondent's contention that the oral comment made by the trial judge was sufficient to create a final judgment on the third-party claim is simply not supported by caselaw. In Suitland Development Corp. v. Merchants Mortgage Co., 254 Md. 43, 56, 254 A.2d 359, 366 (1969), we examined when a decree became final for purposes of appeal and we reiterated our approval of the comment of Judge Digges in Pocock v. Gladden, 154 Md. 249, 253-54, 140 A. 208, 210 (1928), wherein he wrote:
t is our opinion that the date of a decree . . . relating to the time within which appeals from decrees or orders of courts of equity shall be taken, is that date upon which the decree becomes effective and binding, which can only be that date upon which it is filed and becomes a part of the public record of the case.
Specifically applicable to the judge's comments from the bench in the instant case, the Pocock court held that " here is nothing binding in the decree of the court until it is filed, for the simple reason that until it is filed the court could alter or destroy it entirely and substitute some other in its place." 154 Md. at 254, 140 A. at 210. See Associated Realty Co. v. Kimmelman, 19 Md. App. 368, 374, 311 A.2d 464, 467 (1973).
In addition to these Maryland cases, we can turn to the federal courts for guidance. Rule 2-602 is derived from federal rule 54(b), and interpretations of this federal rule are especially persuasive as to the meaning of the Maryland rule. Diener Enterprises, Inc. v. Miller, 266 Md. 551, 295 A.2d 470 (1972).
In Owens v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654 F.2d 218 (3d Cir.1981), an insuranc
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|