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SMITH v. RIDGEWAY CHEMICALS8/27/1990
ement to
each of these separate causes of action is proof that the
product was not reasonably fit or safe for its intended
use. Claytor v. General Motors, 277 S.C. 259,
286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1982).
The appellate courts in this state undertake to correct errors of law on the part of a trial judge. It is incumbent upon an appellant to present a record sufficient to permit a review of a trial judge's rulings. As indicated above, the appellants here have not offered in this record the grounds upon which they moved for a new trial. Accordingly, the appellants have presented no issues relating to the inadequacy of the verdict, the inconsistency of the verdicts or the failure of the trial judge to grant a new trial on the preponderance of the evidence. Stelter v. Kennan, 287 S.C. 389, 339 S.E.2d 116 (1986).
Assuming, without so deciding, that the motion for a new trial not a part of the record properly attacked the verdict in favor of Bobbie Smith as being inadequate, we hold that the verdict may be upset by the trial judge but not by this Court unless an abuse of discretion has been shown. The evidence leaves subject to debate the extent of injuries brought about by the negligent conduct of Dr. Khoury and the extent of her health problems prior thereto. The jury was entitled to weigh the evidence, and we cannot say that the amount awarded for actual and punitive damages warrants reversal by this court. We find no abuse of discretion.
The appellants argue that the trial judge erred by not submitting the husband's loss of consortium claim to the jury under the strict liability cause of action. No objection to the forms of verdict appear in the record. Therefore, this issue is not properly preserved. Additionally, the jury having found that the wife was not entitled to recover on the strict liability issue, it follows that the husband may not and has not been prejudiced.
Both appellants argue certain references to insurance and collateral sources obliged the trial judge to charge the jury on the collateral source rule. We find no error. While the collateral source rule is sometimes warranted as in Rhodes v. Spartanburg County, 262 S.C. 644, 207 S.E.2d 85 (1974), the trial judge is allowed discretion in determining an appropriate charge based on the evidence which he heard. Here such reference as was made to collateral source matters was minimal within an eight-day trial. We conclude from the record that failure to give charge was not prejudicial, even if it might have been given, a point we expressly do not decide.
The contention of counsel that the judge erred by not submitting punitive damages upon the strict liability and negligence causes of action against Ridgeway Chemicals is without merit. The jury having failed to find even actual damages against this Defendant, there can be no prejudice.
As a final argument, the Appellants allege the trial court erred by refusing to admit into evidence two one-gallon containers of a chemical. The Appellants offered these items to support their allegation the label provided only an inadequate warning. Bobbie Smith's testimony was that she would draw chemicals from 55-gallon drums. The court ruled the labeling of one-gallon containers was irrelevant. This ruling was within his discretion. Grand Strand Construction Co. v. Graves, 269 S.C. 594, 239 S.E.2d 81(1977). We find no abuse of that discretion.
Affirmed.
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