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Dunn v. Carruth12/14/1989
F-->12-406, should be applied to situations in which A.R.S. § 12-822(B) permits the state to change venue to Maricopa County.
I write separately because the court has ignored the only questions raised and argued. I would reach the constitutional issues presented by the parties.
For purposes of this concurrence, I need point out only that the statute gives the state the exclusive privilege of transferring all tort cases to Maricopa County, the most congested of the urban centers of the state, for reasons irrelevant to any rational, let alone compelling, state interest. See Cooke v. Berlin, 153 Ariz. 220, 229-30, 735 P.2d 830, 839-40 (Ct.App.1987) (Corcoran, J., dissenting).
The change of venue statute may be an economic boon for Maricopa County lawyers, but the only justification advanced for the disparate treatment favoring the state is that the statute serves the convenience of the attorney general's office and thus of the state. I cling to the view that the attorney general's office and the state government as a whole exist to serve the convenience of the state's citizens. Our citizens would be better served if they were not forced to travel to Phoenix to litigate their rights. It is no inconvenience to the state to argue its cases in the venue proper for all litigants. In any event, I do not believe the convenience of the lawyers representing the state provides a constitutional basis justifying such disparate treatment.
For the reasons set forth in the dissent in Cooke, I would put an end to this chronically recurring problem and hold that A.R.S. § 12-822(B) violates art. 2, §§ 13 and 4 and art. 18, § 6 of our constitution.
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