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LESSARD v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.12/28/1989
(D.Mo. 1985) ("The retroactive award of benefits proves that plaintiff was eligible at the time for such benefits. Plaintiff contracted for one amount, not two. Defendant was entitled to reduce this amount all along."); Henning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 546 F. Supp. 442, 449 (M.D.Pa. 1982) (permitting the recovery of a retroactive SSDIB award through offset of future benefits). Moreover, the Denton court emphasized that "` he fact that a trustee's interpretation is not the correct one as determined by a district court does not establish in itself arbitrary and capricious action, but is a factor in that determination.'" Denton, 765 F.2d at 1304 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). Thus, even if the Plan Administrator's interpretation is not the legally correct one, it is at
With respect to the recoupment issue, plaintiffs' argument is equally lacking in merit. The Superior Court's reliance on trust principles is well grounded in federal ERISA law. See, e.g., Central States v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570, 105 S.Ct. 2833, 2840, 86 L.Ed.2d 447 (1985) (" ather than explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority and responsibility.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, in deciding the § 1132(a)(1)(B) standard of review issue, the Firestone court noted that "ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law" and then cited various provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, as well as pertinent sections of two treatises on the common law of trusts in support of its decision. See Firestone, 109 S.Ct. at 954-5. Plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of the trust principles relied on by the Superior Court, only their application in this case. Accordingly, under the authorities cited above, plaintiffs' argument must fail.
Plaintiffs next argue that even if the Plan Administrator's interpretation is correct, plaintiffs were not sufficiently notified of their potential loss of Plan benefits as required by 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) & (b) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Those provisions impose an obligation on the plan administrator to ensure that the SPD sufficiently informs beneficiaries of "circumstances which may result in . . . denial or loss of benefits." See also §§ 1021 & 1024(b)(1) (vesting in the plan administrator responsibility for the plan description and the SPD). Plaintiffs' argument is without merit. Metropolitan, an ERISA fiduciary for plan administration purposes only, bears no responsibility for the content of the SPD, and therefore cannot be held responsible for its inadequacy. See Stuart, 664 F. Supp. at 621-622.
Count II
Count II alleges that Metropolitan's recoupment practice amounts to an illegal assignment in violation of § 407 of the Social Security Act. That section reads in relevant part:
(a) The right of any person to any future payment under this
subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or
in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights
existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution,
levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to
the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.
42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1982 & Supp. 1989). Relying on Poisson v. Allied Life Ins. Co., 640 F. Supp. 147 (D.Me. 1986), a case presenting this precise issue, the Superior Court ruled that
[Metropolitan] was not asserting any right or entitlement to
[plaintiffs'] social security benefits; [Metropolitan] was
instead seeking a return of an overpayment created by an award
of soc
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