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Shelton v. Greater Cleveland Reg. Transit Auth.12/18/1989
determination of whether the statute substantively impairs legal rights. Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, paragraph three of the syllabus. Remedial legislation may constitutionally be applied retroactively. Cf. id.
The ordinary meaning of the terms generally provide the basis for distinguishing between "remedial" and "substantive" legislation. Id. at 108, 522 N.E.2d at 497.
A statute is substantive if it (1) impairs or takes away vested rights, (2) affects accrued substantive rights, (3) imposes additional burdens or liabilities to past transactions, (4) creates new rights, or (5) creates or precludes the right to bring or defend legal actions. Id. at 107, 522 N.E.2d at 496. "Remedial laws are those affecting only the remedy provided. These include laws which merely substitute a new or more appropriate remedy for the enforcement of an existing right." Id. at 107, 522 N.E.2d at 497.
Applying these standards to R.C. 2744.05(C) requires the conclusion that the statute is remedial and is not an unconstitutional retroactive law. The statute places no limitation on the recovery of actual damages. The law ensures a substantial maximum amount for provable, intangible injuries rather than denies meaningful compensation for these losses by permitting only nominal awards. The statute forecloses no cause of action. The law makes no change in the basis for liability which either lessens or increases the plaintiff's chances of recovery. Compare Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., supras36 Ohio St.3d at 108-109, 522 N.E.2d at 498. Since the law is remedial in nature, it fully comports which the Ohio Constitution's restrictions on retroactive legislation.
We further determine that R.C. 2744.05(C) satisfies equal protection guarantees. The threshold issue in equal protection analysis applicable to the instant action is whether the statute restricts a "fundamental right." Cf. Bd. of Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 373, 12 O.O.3d 327, 330, 390 N.E.2d 813, 818.
The trial court determined that R.C. 2744.05(C) infringes upon the fundamental right of an "open court" as set forth in Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution:
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.
"Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such manner as may be provided by law."
It is clear under the final clause of that section that the Ohio Constitution grants the state legislature the power to limit suits against government institutions. Accordingly, R.C. 2744.05(C) does not violate the Ohio Constitution's open court guarantees. Further, R.C. 2744.05(C) in no way forecloses a personal injury plaintiff from obtaining compensation from a liable political subdivision. Here, too, the law is remedial in nature rather than substantively restricting a fundamental right.
Since R.C. 2744.05(C) is constitutional, the trial court erred in failing to impose the legislated liability restrictions.
The transit authority, in its final assignment of error, claims that the trial court erred in overruling its motion for remittitur. The transit authority argues that passion and prejudice influenced the jury's verdict and that the evidence does not support the jury's $750,000 verdict.
In determining whether passion or prejudice influenced a jury's award, a reviewing court must consider the amount of the award and whether the damages were induced by (1) incompetent evidenc
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