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Pepper Pike v. Felder12/4/1989
KRUPANSKY, P.J.
Defendant Linda Felder was issued a citation for violating Pepper Pike Ordinance 371.05(c), viz., jogging beside another jogger and causing a traffic hazard. Defendant pled not guilty to the charge and challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance on grounds the ordinance was void for vagueness.
After a bench trial, the trial court journalized an order on June 21, 1988 finding defendant guilty of violating Pepper Pike Ordinance 371.OS(c) and concluding the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal assigning four errors.
The relevant facts follow:
On January 28, 1988, at approximately 8:03 a.m., defendant and Margaret Singerman were jogging westbound on Shaker Boulevard in Pepper Pike, Ohio. Officer Thomas Gibson of the Pepper Pike Police Department drove past Felder and Singerman and observed the two women jogging side by side on the edge of the road. Defendant was out in the roadway about three feet jogging beside Singerman who was jogging next to the side of the road. Gibson testified that eastbound traffic was moderate to heavy since it was rush hour. Gibson further testified he observed automobiles slow down and veer toward the center line to avoid hitting the two joggers.
Officer Gibson stopped defendant and her companion. Gibson issued defendant a citation for "running abreast" on Shaker Boulevard and causing a traffic hazard in violation of Pepper Pike Ordinance 371.05(a), (b) and (c). Subsequently, the city deleted the citation's reference to Sections 371.05(a) and (b) and proceeded on Section 371.05(c) only.
At trial, defendant denied jogging beside Singerman. Defendant also challenged the constitutionality of Pepper Pike Ordinance 371.05(c) on vagueness grounds. The trial court found the ordinance constitutional and further found defendant guilty.
Defendant's first assignment of error follows:
"The trial court erred by upholding the constitutionality of Pepper Pike Ordinance Section 371.05(c) which is vague and overly broad as applied to appellant."
Defendant's first assignment of error lacks merit.
Defendant contends Pepper Pike Ordinance 371.05(c) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Defendant's contention is unpersuasive.
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that the language of a criminal statute must be sufficiently definite `to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.' United States v. Harriss (1954), 347 U.S. 612, 617; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville (1972), 405 U.S. 156, 162. The Due Process Clause prohibits the states from holding an individual `criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.' United States v. Harriss, supra, at 617; Wainwright v. Stone (1973), 414 U.S. 21, 22; Rose v. Locke (1975), 423 U.S. 48, 49. * * *" State v. Earlenbaugh (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 19, 21, 18 OBR 16, 17, 479 N.E.2d 846, 848, 52 A.L.R.4th 1153, 1157.
In the case sub judice, defendant has challenged the constitutionality of Pepper Pike Ordinance 371.05(c), which provides as follows:
"No person shall purposely walk, run, jog, stand on or otherwise be in or upon any public street or highway open to motor vehicle traffic other than in a safety zone, in such a manner as to obstruct or interfere with the free passage of vehicular traffic, or to cause an actual or imminent hazardous condition as to any vehicle or person."
Pepper Pike Ordinance 371.05(c) is
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