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Briceno v. Cereal Food Processors11/19/1991
ity benefits on August 7, 1989, and thereafter during the retraining which he is pursuing?
Because Briceno's industrial accident occurred between 1985 and 1987, this Court's recent opinion in Peile v. State Fund (Mont. 1991) [250 Mont. 81,] 817 P.2d 1149, 48 St.Rep. 853, applies. As in that case, §§ 39-71-1001 and -1003, MCA (1985), govern. Section 39-71-1001, MCA (1985), was not limited to totally permanently disabled individuals but applied to all workers "who have become permanently disabled as the result of injuries sustained within the scope and course of employment . . . and who, in the opinion of the division, can be vocationally rehabilitated." Section 39-71-1003, MCA (1985), provided that " person undergoing vocational rehabilitation must be paid temporary total disability benefits." (Emphasis supplied.) As in Peile, any doubt as to the meaning of the statutes must be resolved in favor of the injured worker. Section 39-71-104, MCA (1985).
Briceno is permanently disabled. Since April 1990, he has been undergoing an individual program of vocational rehabilitation through the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS), which was the only entity authorized to provide such a program under § 39-71-1001, MCA (1985). We conclude that Briceno is entitled to temporary total disability benefits while he is undergoing vocational rehabilitation through SRS. As to that period of time, we reverse the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court.
III
Did the court err in failing to award Briceno any lump-sum payment of benefits and a 20 percent increase in his award pursuant to § 39-71-2907, MCA (1985)?
Briceno asserts that while he is continuing with his program of retraining at Eastern Montana College, he "should have sufficient of his compensation awarded in a lump sum so as to prevent him from having to live upon the charity of his aged parents." He also claims entitlement to a 20 percent increase in benefits under § 39-71-2907, MCA (1985), for unreasonable delay or refusal to pay.
In the hearing before the Workers' Compensation Court, Briceno did not present any documentation of his debts, nor did he request a specific amount as a lump sum. The Workers' Compensation Court concluded that "[Briceno] has failed to demonstrate to the Court that the receipt of a lump sum would be in his best interest." Section 39-71-741(2), MCA (1985), provided that " t is presumed that biweekly payments are in the best interests of the worker." In the absence of any documentation of the amount of Briceno's debts or a request for a lump sum in a specific amount, we hold that the court did not err in determining that Briceno failed to demonstrate that a lump-sum payment would be in his best interest.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE and JUSTICES HARRISON, TRIEWEILER, GRAY, McDONOUGH, HUNT, and WEBER concur.
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