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Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Board11/7/1991
ndicate an unfitness to practice for purposes of RCW 18.130.180(1). As we explained above, conduct may indicate unfitness to practice the profession either by raising concerns that the individual may use the professional position to harm members of the public, or by tending to lower the standing of the profession in the public's eyes, thereby affecting the quality of public health which is a legitimate public concern. Dr. Haley used the trust and confidence he established, as a surgeon, with a minor child of 16 years to develop a relationship of sexual exploitation, a relationship that harmed both the child and her parents. Such conduct demonstrates unfitness to practice medicine for purposes of RCW 18.130.180(1).
The cases on which Dr. Haley relies are distinguishable. In McDonnell v. Commission on Med. Discipline, supra, the Maryland court was applying a statute prohibiting "' mmoral conduct of a physician in his practice as a physician", and the court appropriately stated that "immoral conduct" under this statute "must occur while in the
performance of a physician's practice". 301 Md. at 434. We are applying RCW 18.130.180(1), however, which is broader than the Maryland statute because it prohibits not just immoral conduct in the practice of a physician, but "moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption relating to the practice of the person's profession". As we have explained, under this statute, a professional's conduct may indicate unfitness to practice without having occurred during the actual performance of professional practice. Atienza v. Taub, supra, is also inapposite. The issue there, unlike the present case, was not whether sexual contact with a patient or former patient warranted disciplinary action but whether such contact could serve as the basis for the patient's action for medical malpractice.
Dr. Haley also argues that RCW 18.130.180(1)<!--/REF--> is unconstitutionally vague. We disagree.
The protections of due process apply to medical disciplinary proceedings. In re Kindschi, 52 Wash. 2d 8, 11, 319 P.2d 824 (1958). A vague statute offends due process. In re Curran, 115 Wash. 2d 747, 758, 801 P.2d 962 (1990). Therefore, any statute under which sanctions may be imposed for unprofessional conduct must not be unconstitutionally vague.
[12, 13] A statute is presumed to be constitutional. Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wash. 2d 22, 26, 759 P.2d 366, 78 A.L.R.4th 1115 (1988); State v. Maciolek, 101 Wash. 2d 259, 263, 676 P.2d 996 (1984). The party challenging a statute's constitutionality on vagueness grounds has the burden of proving its vagueness beyond a reasonable doubt. Eze, at 26; Maciolek, at 263.
A statute is void for vagueness if it is framed in terms so vague that persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application". Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L. Ed. 322, 46 S. Ct. 126 (1926); In re Curran, at 758. The purpose of the vagueness doctrine is to ensure that citizens receive fair notice as to what conduct is proscribed,
and to prevent the law from being arbitrarily enforced. Eze, at 26.
The prohibition against vague laws is not absolute. Some measure of vagueness is inherent in the use of language. "Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language." Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 33 L. Ed. 2d 22
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