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Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Board11/7/1991
es an unfitness to teach. 1 Cal. 3d at 225. The court held that so construed, the statute had the required specificity to withstand a vagueness challenge: "Teachers, particularly in the light of their professional expertise, will normally be able to determine what kind of conduct indicates unfitness to teach." 1 Cal. 3d at 233.<BR>
Morrison established that "where the language of a statute fails to provide an objective standard by which conduct can be judged, the required specificity may nonetheless be provided by the common knowledge and understanding of members of the particular vocation or profession to which the statute applies." Cranston v. Richmond, 40 Cal. 3d 755, 765, 710 P.2d 845, 221 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1985). A number of California decisions have reaffirmed this proposition. For example, in Hand v. Board of Examiners in Veterinary Medicine, 66 Cal. App. 3d 605, 136 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1977), a veterinarian's license was suspended under a statute prohibiting " onduct reflecting unfavorably on the profession of veterinary medicine.'" Hand, at 617 n.3 (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code ยง 4882). The California Court of Appeals declared that this statute "fails on its face to provide a standard by which conduct can be uniformly judged." Hand, at 622. However, following Morrison, the court concluded that "the required specificity is provided by common knowledge of members of the particular vocation", and so rejected a vagueness challenge to the statute. Hand, at 622. Similarly, in Cranston v. Richmond, supra, the California Supreme Court followed Morrison and Hand in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a city personnel rule under which a police officer was discharged for "' onduct unbecoming an employee of the City Service.'" Cranston, at 762-63. "Police officers," the court explained, "like teachers and veterinarians, will normally be able to determine what kind of conduct indicates unfitness to perform the functions of a police officer." Cranston, at 769.
[16, 17] We agree that the term "moral turpitude", standing alone and unapplied, has a meaning difficult to fathom. Reading RCW 18.130.180(1)<!--/REF--> as a whole, however, we interpret the statute as prohibiting conduct indicating unfitness to practice the profession. This interpretation is supplemented, and the statute is given further content, in two ways. First, as we explained above, the statute is rendered
more specific by reference to the purposes of professional discipline: to protect the public and the profession's standing in the eyes of the public. Second, we agree with the Morrison court that the common knowledge and understanding of members of the particular profession to which a statute applies may also provide the needed specificity to withstand a vagueness challenge.
When RCW 18.130.180(1)<!--/REF--> is construed in relation to the purposes of professional discipline, considered in the context of a specific application, and supplemented by the shared knowledge and understanding of medical practitioners, its content is sufficiently clear as to put persons of common understanding on notice that certain conduct is prohibited. Physicians no less than teachers, as in Morrison, veterinarians, as in Hand, or police officers, as in Cranston, will be able to determine what kind of conduct indicates unfitness to practice their profession. The question remains whether Dr. Haley's conduct falls within the constitutional application of RCW 18.130.180(1).
Dr. Haley engaged in an extended sexual relationship with M., who was 16 years old when the relationship began, and who had been his patient until only months befor
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