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Howard v. Cunard Line Ltd.12/27/1988
ourt may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's:
"(1) Transacting any business in this state;
"(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
"(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
"(4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;
"(5) Causing injury in this state to any person by breach of warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this state when he might reasonably have expected such person to use, consume, or be affected by the goods in this state, provided that he also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;
"(6) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act outside this state committed with the purpose of injuring persons, when he might reasonably have expected that some person would be injured thereby in this state;
"(7) Causing tortious injury to any person by a criminal act, any element of which takes place in this state, which he commits or in the commission of which he is guilty of complicity.[;]
"(8) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state;
"(9) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting."
The Gelfand court found " ubsection (1) is inapplicable due to the application of the 'mere solicitation doctrine' which holds the mere solicitation of business in a state by agents of a foreign corporation did not constitute doing business therein so as to render the corporation amenable to the jurisdiction and process of the courts in the state.' Wainscott v. Railroad Co. (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 133 [1 O.O.3d 78, 351 N.E.2d 466]." The court concluded that even if the travel agency was an agent of the defendant cruise line, the "mere solicitation" of business would not satisfy the due process requirement of minimal contacts. The court found subsections (2) through (9) to be inapplicable by their language because some act or acts had to take place in Ohio, evidence of which did not exist.
The plaintiff in the present case, like the plaintiff in Gelfand, relied on the "transacting any business" provision of R.C. 2307.382(A) (1). We also finsthat provision to be inapplicable since the solicitation of passengers was the only business transaction involved. Further, subsections (2) through (9) are also inapplicable under the present facts.
We conclude that the facts of Gelfand are similar to the present facts and as such we are bound by Gelfand's conclusion.
Appellant's assignment of error is therefore well-taken. The trial court erred in not vacating the void default judgment as it lacked in personam jurisdiction over the defendant-appellant.
The trial court is now ordered to vacate the default judgment.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
MATIA, P.J., and NAHRA, J., concur.
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