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Feudo v. Pavlik12/12/1988 commenced within one year of the accrual of the cause of action. Upon our review of the record, we find that appellant's action was timely filed and that, consequently, the trial court erred in grant-
ing appellees, summary judgment motion.
In their summary judgment motion, appellees argued that appellant should have discovered that his injuries were caused by appellees at the very latest on March 28, 1985 and that additionally the attorney-client relationship terminated, at the latest, as of March 28, 1985. Appellees submitted deposition testimony of appellant and attorney Richard Baumgart that appellant consulted Baumgart on March 28, 1985 for possible help with his case. Appellees maintained that the deposition testimony as well as the affidavits of appellant and attorneys Baumgart and Lancione, as submitted by appellant, demonstrated the disintegration of the attorney-client relationship. Appellees conceded that appellee Pavlik's representation was "nominally continuous until the appeal was decided," but "ceased being an exclusive attorney-client relationship as of March 28, 1985."
Appellant countered with affidavits from himself and attorney Baumgart which revealed that appellant did consult Baumgart to determine if he could help in the appeal process, but that appellant was advised to wait until the court's decision. In Baumgart's deposition, Baumgart states that he never had an understanding with appellant that he would represent him.
It is apparent from the record that the attorney-client relationship between appellant and appellees continued through the appeal period. Appellees conceded that appellee Pavlik did continue to work on the appeal. Consultation with another attorney about possible assistance with his case did not terminate that relationship. Appellees place great reliance on Brown v. Johnstone (1982), 5 Ohio App.3d 165, 5 OBR 347, 450 N.E.2d 693, for the proposition that conduct which dissolves the essential mutual confidence between attorney and client signals the termination of the attorney-client relationship. However, we find that case distinguishable as there the client initiated grievance proceedings before the local bar association and had no further contact with his attorney after that. Mere discussions with a second lawyer about a case, as in the instant case, unbeknownst to the first lawyer, do not signal the termination of the attorney-client relationship with the first lawyer.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that appellant's action was commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment.
Appellant's assignment of error is well-taken.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment accordingly.
Krupansky, P.J., and Markus, J., concur.
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