ROOF v. KIMBROUGH
11/28/1988
as correct in striking the allegations regarding the injections.
Finally, the Roofs contend the trial judge erred in limiting counsel to thirty minutes for summation. The Roofs argue this was an abuse of discretion given the complexity of the case and the length of the trial.
In the civil case of Harley v. City of Spartanburg, 230 S.C. 478, 96 S.E.2d 828 (1957), our supreme Court held it was within the discretion of the trial judge to limit the length of time for argument. This holding has not been changed by Rule 43(i), S.C.R.C.P., which provides in part:
No more than two hours shall be taken by each side in
final argument or sum up, without permission of the
court.
Similar to this rule is § 40-5-330, South Carolina Code of Laws, 1976, which provides:
No attorney, solicitor or counsellor shall be allowed to
occupy more than two hours of the time of the court in
the argument of any cause, unless he shall first obtain
the special permission of the court to do so.
In the case of State v. El, 286 S.C. 560, 335 S.E.2d 544 (1985), our Supreme Court held § 40-5-330 did not give a criminal defendant the absolute right to argue for two hours and the trial judge has discretion to limit oral argument to some lesser period of time. We therefore hold under Harley and Rule 43(i), the trial judge has discretion to limit oral argument to less than two hours in civil matters. Under the facts of this case we find there is no evidence the trial judge abused this discretion.
Affirmed.
CURETON and LITTLEJOHN, JJ., concur.