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Cikan v. ARCO Alaska12/16/2005
When considered in the light most favorable to Cikan, then, the totality of the evidence in the record - including Dr. Wolf's affidavit, the other affidavits and documentation submitted by Cikan, and Cikan's own verified statement - readily meets the "more than a scintilla of contrary evidence" standard necessary to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cikan became incompetent during the two years immediately following her fall.
ARCO nevertheless argues that the affidavits and records Cikan attached to her opposition provided no support for her claim of incompetency, because they "consisted of inadmissible hearsay based on lay witness testimonials" or did not reflect on her condition in the years immediately after the 1991 accident. But while this may be correct as to some of the exhibits, not all the affidavits can be so easily dismissed.
Taken together and viewed in the light most favorable to Cikan, these records and affidavits provide substantial circumstantial evidence supporting Dr. Wolf's expert assessment.
ARCO separately argues that Cikan's allegations against Kalamarides should be treated as binding judicial admissions that she cannot now dispute. But ARCO's position overstates the binding effect of a judicial admission, which only extends to the case in which the admission was made: "Judicial admissions are not evidence at all but rather have the effect of withdrawing a fact from contention. Included within this category are admissions in the pleadings in the case . . . . Ordinary evidentiary admissions, on the other hand, may be controverted or explained by the party. Within this category fall the pleadings in another case[.]"
In summary, because we find ample evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact and no legal justification for treating Cikan's prior pleadings in the Kalamarides suit as currently binding admissions, we hold that it was error to dismiss Cikan's claim on summary judgment.
Our decision on this point leaves one question unanswered: how should this factual dispute over mental incompetency be resolved? In their briefing and at oral argument, both parties seemed to assume that the jury would have to decide the issue.
But as we have already indicated above, disputes concerning the statute of limitations raise preliminary questions of fact that should ordinarily be decided by the court after conducting an evidentiary hearing. In the present case, then, the superior court should conduct a pretrial evidentiary hearing on remand to resolve ARCO's statute-of-limitations defense.
IV. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the order granting summary judgment and REMAND for an evidentiary hearing to determine if Cikan's claim is time-barred.
FABE, Justice, dissenting
Christine Cikan's slip-and-fall accident occurred on December 17, 1991. When attorney Joseph Kalamarides declined Cikan's request that he handle her workers' compensation case related to the accident, he informed Cikan in writing that she had only two years from the date of the accident to file a personal injury claim against ARCO. Thus, Cikan was aware that she was required to file suit against ARCO by December 17, 1993. Yet Cikan did not file her lawsuit until April 2000. The court concludes that Cikan presented sufficient evidence of her mental incompetency to defeat ARCO's motion for summary judgment and prevent dismissal of her action as time-barred. But a careful examination of Cikan's evidence reveals that she presented virtually no evidence of mental incompetency during the relevant time period of 1991-1993. I therefore disagree with the court's decision to reverse the trial cour
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