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Ex parte Haynes downard Andra & Jones7/29/2005
Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc. v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d 293, 297 (Ala. 1998)."
Ex parte Fontaine Trailer Co., 854 So. 2d 71, 83 (Ala. 2003).Thus, to honor the legislative directive and treat the Bessemer Division as a separate "judicial district" for purposes of venue does not require us to depart from the treatment accorded venue as it relates to the Bessemer Division by Glenn v. Wilson, Humana, Longmire, and Chrysler Corp., supra.
Haynes Downard also argues that to the extent § 6-3-7(d) might otherwise alter the venue status of the Bessemer Division, it would do so only in the case of corporate defendants. "Because § 6-3-7(d) is part of a provision applicable only to corporations, it would not apply to Haynes Downard, which consists of an Alabama Limited Liability Partnership and [to Jones,] a natural person." (Petition, pp. 14-15 n. 3.) RockSolid does denominate Haynes Downard in the complaint as an "LLP" and characterizes it in the body of the complaint as "a limited liability partnership organized and existing pursuant to the laws of the State of Alabama." A registered limited liability partnership must include as the last letters of its name the abbreviation "LLP," or otherwise include a reference to its status in its name. Ala. Code 1975, § 10-8A-1002. Such a partnership "is for all purposes, except as provided in Section 10-8A-306 [not relevant to our inquiry], the same entity that existed before the registration and continues to be a partnership under the laws of this state ...." § 10-8A-1001(i). "The method for determining the correct venue in actions against [a corporation] is not applicable to the question of venue in an action against a partnership." Ex parte Wilson, 706 So. 2d 1151, 1155 (Ala. 1997).
Does § 6-3-7(d) apply only to corporations? RockSolid appeared to entertain that view in the response it filed in the trial court to Haynes Downard's motion to sever and transfer, stating:
"Section 6-3-7(d), at least as to suits against corporations, changed the law regarding the issue of venue in the Bessemer Division. ... When read in para materia with the rest of Ala. Code (1975) § 6-3-7, the text of Section 6-3-7(d) clearly demonstrates that the Legislature directed our courts to apply the substantive venue law for corporations, Section 6-3-7(a)-(c) to the Bessemer Division as though it were a separate county."
In its brief to this Court, RockSolid again acknowledges the possibility of this limited effect of § 6-3-7(d), stating: "With the enactment of Section 6-3-7(d), the Legislature recognized the confusion created by the separate local acts and rectified the problems in Barbour and Jefferson counties at least as to suits against corporations."
As noted, subdivision (d) is part of the legislature's complete rewrite of § 6-3-7, which before the rewrite had only prescribed venue as to corporations; it said nothing about the counties having two courthouses. The amendatory legislative act, Act No. 99-249, Ala. Acts 1999, stated in its title two purposes, separated by a semicolon: "To amend Section 6-3-7, Code of Alabama 1975, relating to venue of civil actions against corporations and transfer of venue, to provide further for venue and transfer of venue; to repeal Section 6-3-5, Code of Alabama 1975." Section 1 of Act No. 99-249 states that "Section 6-3-7, Code of Alabama 1975, is amended to read as follows." The text now codified as 6-3-7(a)-(d) follows. Section 2 of the act repeals Section 6-3-5 and contains a qualified repealer clause.
"Of course, the rule is well recognized that in the construction of a statute, the legislative intent is to be determ
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