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Ex parte Haynes downard Andra & Jones7/29/2005
E>"'279 Ala. at 513, 187 So. 2d at 267. These general principles control in the case before us. Applying these principles, we opine that the alleged wrong for which the petitioners seek redress occurred in the Birmingham Division, and, thus, the cause of action arose there.'"
879 So.2d at 552. In Walter Industries we also cited Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. Bryant, 421 So. 2d 1254, 1256 (Ala. 1982), for the statement that "'a case arises wherever the alleged wrong occurs.'" 879 So. 2d at 552. RockSolid relies on Ex parte Birmingham Southern R.R., 473 So. 2d 500, 501 (Ala. 1985), for the statement that a personal-injury action asserted against Birmingham Southern Railroad arose in the Bessemer Division because "a personal injury action arises where the injury occurs." However, in Ex parte Graham, 634 So. 2d 994, 997 (Ala. 1993), we stated:
"We now bring focus to these holdings by establishing the following interpretation of ยง 6-3-7 [the venue statute for corporations]: In personal injury actions where the defendant's wrongful act or omission causes the plaintiff to suffer mental and/or emotional distress, or other nonbodily injuries, the injury occurs in the county where the defendant's wrongful act or omission occurred. In personal injury actions where the defendant's wrongful act or omission causes bodily harm to the plaintiff, the injury occurs in the county where the bodily harm occurs."
Accordingly, although a fraud action is a personal-injury action for purposes of venue law (see Ex parte Mitchell, 690 So. 2d 356, 358 (Ala. 1997)), the rule of Ex parte Birmingham Southern R.R., relied on by RockSolid, would not apply to place venue for a fraud action involving nonbodily injuries in the division in which the injury occurred. Thus, even if we were to consider the principle of general venue law stated in Ex parte Birmingham Southern R.R. to be applicable in this case, the distinction explained in Ex parte Graham between personal-injury actions resulting in bodily injuries and those resulting in nonbodily injuries would render the place where the injury allegedly occurred immaterial. Moreover, as is true for any tort cause of action, a fraud claim fully accrues once any legally cognizable damage has proximately resulted, i.e., once the plaintiff has "detrimentally" relied on the fraud; the fact that additional or different damage subsequently materializes does not alter the fact that a legally cognizable injury has already occurred. Gilmore v. M & B Realty Co., 895 So. 2d 200, 208 (Ala. 2004). Thus, the cause of action for fraud as alleged by RockSolid against Haynes Downard accrued once RockSolid Industries purchased Grasselli's allegedly misrepresented assets on September 28, 2001. The subsequent failure of RockSolid Industries in 2002 simply represented additional damage. RockSolid argues alternatively, without citing any authority, that " or purposes of determining where a cause of action arises under the Bessemer act,[ ] this Court should look at the entire case, including all claims properly joined pursuant to Rule 20 [Ala. R. Civ. P.], in determining whether venue is proper in Bessemer [Division]." This argument was never presented to the trial court, but, " ubject to limited exceptions, an appellate court will affirm a summary judgment on the basis of a law or legal principle not invoked by the moving party or the trial court, even though an appellate court will not reverse a summary judgment on the basis of a law or legal principle not first argued to the trial court by the nonmoving party." Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Milam & Co. Constr., 901 So. 2d 84, 104 (Ala. 2004)(footnote omitted). Although Rule 20, Ala. R. Civ. P., permi
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