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Ex parte Haynes downard Andra & Jones7/29/2005
visions simply had "a waivable right" to have the action tried in the courthouse in the geographical division in which the defendant resided. 659 So. 2d at 117. Thus, despite the fact that juries for civil cases tried in either the Clayton Division or the Eufaula Division were drawn exclusively from within that particular division, the legislation creating the two divisions did not accord them the status of the judicial divisions legislatively established for Jefferson County and Coffee County, i.e., the two divisions in Barbour County were deemed not to be separate judicial districts for purposes of venue. In making that distinction in Chrysler Corporation, this Court cited, and relied upon the reasoning of, Glenn v. Wilson, 455 So. 2d 2 (Ala. 1984), and Ex parte Humana, supra. The Court noted that those two cases recognized the fact that in the legislation creating the two divisions in Jefferson County and Coffee County, respectively, one of the divisions was given "exclusive jurisdiction" of all causes of actions arising therein (or, alternatively, as to Coffee County, causes of action arising in the division in which the defendants resided), with the result that (disregarding a defendant's residence) the particular division would have the "exclusive jurisdiction" for purposes of venue of a cause of action arising in the division. Therefore, under those respective statutes of creation, a defendant in an action arising in the division given exclusive jurisdiction for venue purposes would have the right, enforceable by the writ of mandamus, to have an action filed in the other division transferred to the division having exclusive jurisdiction. In Humana, the Court noted that Rule 82(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., providing for actions against individuals to be brought in a certain county when the existing statutes established venue for individuals at law and in equity were inconsistent, did not "suffice to resolve the venue question" relating to the two judicial divisions, because Rule 82 refers only "to the proper county." 462 So. 2d at 924.
Accordingly, and as the legislature would have understood in 1999 when it undertook to redraft § 6-3-7, "suits 'arising in' the geographical boundaries of the Bessemer Cutoff but filed in Birmingham (or, vice versa, suits 'arising in' the Birmingham Division but filed in Bessemer) are subject to transfer to the proper division pursuant to the provisions of § 12-11-11 Code 1975." Glenn v. Wilson, 455 So. 2d at 4.
Considering this pre-1999 backdrop of court decisions, we conclude that Justice Houston accurately assessed the legislative intent with respect to § 6-3-7(d) in his special writing in Hanna Steel, ___ So. 2d at ___:
"In my opinion, Act No. 99-249 [which enacted § 6-3-7(d)] did not revoke Act No. 213, as amended. It merely addressed the holding in Ex parte Chrysler Corp., 659 So. 2d 113 (Ala. 1995), where I, writing for a unanimous division of the Supreme Court, wrote:
"'Insofar as civil actions are concerned, Barbour County is a single entity, and a cause of action arising in any geographical part of Barbour County can be filed in either courthouse in Barbour County, without violating the general venue laws of the state.'
"659 So. 2d at 117.
"Barbour County has had two courthouses--one in the county seat of Clayton and the other in Eufaula--since the enactment of Act No. 106, Acts of Alabama 1878-79 ....
"In Ex parte Chrysler Corp., the defendants in a wrongful-death action argued that the Eufaula and Clayton divisions of Barbour County should be treated as two separate judicial districts for venu
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