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City of Crossville v. Haynes8/12/2005
ence on the part of the City and the death of the decedent.
"4. Whether the trial court erred to reversal in allowing [Haynes] to ask an officer about any training received after the death of the decedent, where the answer (none) was irrelevant and highly prejudicial, and where the answer should have been excluded as analogous to a subsequent remedial measure."
Analysis
The City of Crossville first asserts that the negligent-training claim asserted against it should not have been submitted to the jury. In Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Insurance Co., 875 So. 2d 1143 (Ala. 2003), this Court stated the standard of review applicable to a trial court's ruling on a motion for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML"):
"When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court uses the same standard the trial court used initially in deciding whether to grant or deny the motion for a JML. Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate question is whether the non-movant has presented sufficient evidence to allow the case to be submitted to the jury for a factual resolution. The non-movant must have presented substantial evidence in order to withstand a motion for a JML. A reviewing court must determine whether the party who bears the burden of proof has produced substantial evidence creating a factual dispute requiring resolution by the jury. In reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and entertains such reasonable inferences as the jury would have been free to draw. Regarding a question of law, however, this Court indulges no presumption of correctness as to the trial court's ruling."
875 So. 2d at 1152 (citations omitted).
The City of Crossville asserts that the requirements of Popham, supra, and its progeny, addressing suicides of inmates, were not met in this case. More specifically, the City of Crossville argues that it could not have foreseen Corley's suicide because (1) he had no history of suicidal proclivities, (2) he did not manifest suicidal proclivities in the presence of the defendants, and (3) he was not admitted to the facility because of a suicide attempt. The City of Crossville, relying on Popham, supra; Smith v. King, 615 So. 2d 69 (Ala. 1993); Tittle v. Giattina Fisher & Co., Architects, 597 So. 2d 679 (Ala. 1992); and Williams v. Lee County, 78 F.3d 491 (11th Cir. 1996), argues that the evidence presented in this case was not sufficient to give rise to a fact question on the issue of foreseeability.
"We have held that proof of the existence of a duty owing from the defendant to the injured party is a prerequisite for proving negligence or wantonness, Alabama Power Co. v. Laney, 428 So. 2d 21 (Ala. 1983), and that the question of whether a legal duty exists is essentially a question of law for the court, Rose v. Miller & Co., Inc., 432 So. 2d 1237 (Ala. 1983), to be resolved by determining whether the injury was foreseeable."
Keebler v. Winfield Carraway Hosp., 531 So. 2d 841, 844 (Ala. 1988).
As this Court recognized in Keebler, supra, unless the resulting injury was reasonably foreseeable, no legal duty to prevent that injury exists and no liability results from failing to prevent the injury. Additionally, in Popham, 582 So. 2d at 543, this Court stated:
"The controlling factor in determining whether there may be a recovery for a failure to prevent a suicide is whether the defendants reasonably should have anticipated that the deceased would attempt to harm himself. Annot., 11 A.L.R. 2d 751, 782-92 (1950). In Keebler v. Winfield Carraway Hospital, 531 So. 2d 841 (Ala. 1988), t
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