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Davis v. Riley10/21/2005
Lester L. Davis appeals from the Montgomery Circuit Court's dismissal of his complaint, which alleged violations of inmate Michael E. Thatch's civil rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand the case with instructions.
Davis filed a complaint requesting that the circuit court issue a declaratory judgment and grant injunctive relief against the named defendants, -- Governor Bob Riley, Department of Corrections Commissioner Donal Campbell, and Attorney General Troy King, -- for allegedly conspiring to deprive Thatch (Davis's brother), who was incarcerated at Holman Correctional Facility ("Holman"), of his "life, liberty, and property" in denying Thatch proper medical care for a terminal illness. Davis also sought compensatory and punitive damages.
In his complaint, Davis, who is himself incarcerated, asserted that Thatch had been previously diagnosed with cancer at Holman. Davis further averred that the medical staff and hospital ward at Holman were ill-equipped to offer proper medical attention to Thatch and that Davis had requested that his brother be moved to a different prison facility that could offer "proper" treatment for Thatch's cancer. Davis further requested that the circuit court issue a declaratory judgment finding that Holman's lack of proper medical facilities constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On April 21, 2005, before service had been perfected on the named defendants, the circuit court, on its own motion, dismissed Davis's complaint with prejudice, stating, in pertinent part:
"The Court has also reviewed the complaint in this case and, ex mero motu, finds that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff seeks substantial damages because his brother, an inmate, has been denied adequate medical care. Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue the claim. See Robinson v. Hadden, 537 So. 2d 931 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998)."
Davis appealed; the Alabama Supreme Court transferred this appeal to this court pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975.
"'On review of a judgment of dismissal [for failure to state a claim], the judgment is not entitled to a presumption of correctness. The appropriate standard of review is whether the plaintiff could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. In reviewing a dismissal, [an appellate court] does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether the plaintiff may possibly prevail. A dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.'"
Access Capital, Inc. v. Uptown, Inc., 863 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (quoting Green v. Nemish, 652 So. 2d 243, 244 (Ala. 1994)).
Davis argues on appeal that the circuit court abused its discretion in dismissing his claim sua sponte, on the basis of a lack of standing, before service of process had been perfected upon the named defendants and without allowing him to amend his complaint. We agree.
It is uncertain from the circuit court's judgment whether the dismissal is based upon a lack of standing or upon a failure of Davis to demonstrate that he is the real party in interest to litgate claims arising from the treatment of Thatch's cancer. Our Supreme Court distinguished the principles of "real party in interest" and "standing" in State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025 (Ala. 1999):
"There are fundamental differences between the principles of 'real party in interest' and 'standing.' '" he rea
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