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Bryant v. Robledo6/30/2005
-37 (Ala. 2002) (discussing Alabama law and declining to change the rule of law that bars an action for legal malpractice against a lawyer by a plaintiff for whom the lawyer has not undertaken a duty, either by contract or gratuitously).
However, the mere fact that James Bryant has not admitted that he had a direct contract with the Robledos does not demonstrate that the Bryants' motion to dismiss was due to be granted in its entirety. Even if no direct contract between James Bryant and the Robledos existed, the Robledos also argued that James Bryant knew at the time that he requested payment of the $15,000 by the Robledos that Nave was incompetent and could not contract for legal representation. If the Robledos could produce evidence to support that contention, then a claim of fraudulent inducement would be shown and would preclude dismissal of the Robledos' claim of fraud. See, e.g., Kinney v. Williams, 886 So. 2d 753 (Ala. 2003) (nonclients had standing to sue attorney alleging fraud and misrepresentation, even though they did not have a contractual relationship with the attorney). To that extent, then, the trial court did not err in denying the Bryants' motion to dismiss on the basis that the Robledos lacked standing to assert their fraud claim and, subsequently, in granting the Robledos' motion for a summary judgment.
The Bryants next assert that the trial court erred in ordering that, due to the Bryants' failure to properly or to timely respond to the Robledos' requests for admissions, those matters would be deemed admitted. See Rule 36(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. The Bryants rely primarily on the decision of Cole v. Cooley, 547 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989), which was ostensibly predicated upon our Supreme Court's holding in Irons v. Le Sueur, 487 So. 2d 1352 (Ala. 1986).
The underlying facts in Irons were quite unusual. In that case, the party propounding the admissions sought a negative answer but, instead, due probably to a typographical error, elicited an admission from the party's opponent that negated the entire theory of the party's action. Our Supreme Court held that the trial court was not required to view that admission as conclusively establishing a fact; instead, the Supreme court ruled that the trial court's factual determinations, including one that had directly contradicted the admission and had been made following a review of all the evidence submitted, could be deemed correct based on the ore tenus standard. Irons, 487 So. 2d at 1355. In making that decision, our Supreme Court noted that " he purpose of Rule 36 is to expedite the trial and to relieve the parties of the cost of proving facts which will not be disputed and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry." Id. In addition, our Supreme Court noted:
"[The response to a specific request for an admission] was simply evidence to be considered by the trial court. Where a case is tried ore tenus, as here, the trial court's findings are presumed correct and its judgment ... will be reversed only if, after consideration of all the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, the judgment ... is found to be plainly and palpably wrong."
Id.
This court purported to apply that rule in Cole v. Cooley, supra, where the trial court considered other evidence in reaching a conclusion that was inconsistent with a number of the matters that were subject to being deemed admitted based upon the prevailing party's failure to respond to certain admission requests. Cole, 547 So. 2d at 1188. Cole concluded by flatly stating that " Rule 36 request for admissions may not be used by a party to conclusively establish a fact which is obviously in dispute." Id.
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