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Second Injury Fund v. Sedgwick James of Arkansas11/9/2005
. Swaim v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., ____ Ark. App. ____, ____ S.W.3d ____ (May 25, 2005). The question is not whether the evidence would have supported findings contrary to the ones made by the Commission; there may be substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision even though we might have reached a different conclusion if we sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo. Id. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. We will not reverse a decision of the Commission unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Commission. Id.
The healing period is that period for healing of the injury which continues until the employee is as far restored as the permanent character of the injury will permit. Castleberry v. Elite Lamp Co., 69 Ark. App. 359, 13 S.W.3d 211 (2000). If the underlying condition causing the disability has become more stable and if nothing further in the way of treatment will improve that condition, the healing period has ended. Id. Whether an employee's healing period has ended is a factual determination to be made by the Commission. Id.
Here, the cross-appellants rely upon 1) Dr. DeHaan's January 14, 1999 letter, assessing a 25 % impairment rating; 2) DeHaan's May 14, 1999 deposition, assessing 15% of the 25% as pre-existing and 10% as related to the August 1997 injury ; and 3) Dr. Green's August 28, 2001 assessment of a 10% permanent impairment to the body as a whole. They contend that "the healing period ended when the treating physician, Dr. DeHaan, gave the same rating [as Dr. Green] first on January 14, 1999, i.e. (25% which was 10% over the pre-existing 15% rating)." The Commission rejected the argument and found that the healing period ended on August 28, 2001. We hold that there was substantial evidence to support this finding.
As noted by the ALJ, cross-appellants contested the compensability of Randle's claim from its inception in August 1997; consequently, treatment measures recommended for the injury were not implemented until the December 15, 1999 Commission opinion; and the January 14, 1999 correspondence from Dr. DeHaan, upon which the employer relied, was written pursuant to an inquiry from Randle's attorney and it began by noting what needed to be done for Randle's injury. In fact, the letter itself states, "I would estimate . . . ." Moreover, the ALJ noted that in his deposition, Dr. DeHaan testified that the impairment ratings contained in the January 14, 1999 letter were estimates and that Randle still had not reached maximum medical improvement as of the deposition date, May 4, 1999. In addition, the ALJ noted that Randle continued to be seen and to receive medical treatment under the care of Dr. DeHaan relative to the August 1997 compensable injury through August 2001. Finally, the ALJ noted that Randle was evaluated by Dr. Barry Green, a Texarkana orthopedic physician, upon Dr. DeHaan's referral, and that Dr. Green found Randle was at maximum medical improvement as of August 28, 2001. We are not convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Commission.
Affirmed on direct appeal and on cross-appeal.
Hart and Crabtree, JJ., agree.
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