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People7/28/2005
place for this appointment type or in this court" and that the attorney was to be paid an hourly rate. Counsel filed a motion to be relieved of the appointment, indicating that, although he had a previous contract with the state, he was no longer accepting appointments in dependency and neglect cases. He also asserted that (1) the compensation paid by the state did not adequately compensate him for his time, training, and experience; (2) the appointment violates his constitutional right to equal protection because fewer attorneys are available in rural than in urban areas to accept court appointments and rural attorneys thus shoulder a disproportionate burden of representing indigent parents; and (3) his involuntary appointment creates a conflict of interest between him and his client.
The trial court denied the motion, concluding that "should counsel desire to not practice in the courts of the County any longer, he may be relieved of the burden of court-appointments in this County." The court did not make any factual findings or cite any authority in support of its conclusion.
A.
As an initial matter, we address whether the attorney has standing to raise his claim in the context of mother's appeal of the dispositional order. We conclude that he does.
Mother does not challenge the order denying counsel's motion to be relieved of his appointment, counsel is not a party and did not move to intervene in the dependency and neglect proceeding, and he is not a party on appeal.
A nonparty has standing to appeal an order of the trial court following entry of final judgment if it appears that the nonparty is substantially aggrieved by the order. Bush v. Winker, 907 P.2d 79 (Colo. 1995); Miller v. Clark, 144 Colo. 431, 356 P.2d 965 (1960); Roberts-Henry v. Richter, 802 P.2d 1159 (Colo. App. 1990).
To be substantially aggrieved, a nonparty must have been denied some claim of right or have been burdened with a substantial obligation. Colo. Permanente Med. Group, P.C. v. Evans, 926 P.2d 1218 (Colo. 1996); Bush v. Winker, supra; see also Bye v. Dist. Court, 701 P.2d 56, 58 n.10 (Colo. 1985)(court-appointed attorneys substantially aggrieved by trial court's denial of requested attorney fees); Tower v. Tower, 147 Colo. 480, 364 P.2d 565 (1961)(attorney substantially aggrieved by trial court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to award fees to which attorney was entitled); Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 91 P.3d 425 (Colo. App. 2003) (although administrators of health insurance plan were not parties to the contract between the plan and the insureds, administrators had standing to appeal declaratory judgment regarding coverage because that determination directly affected insureds' bad faith claims against administrators), rev'd on other grounds, 108 P.3d 288 (Colo. 2005).
Here, mother's attorney is substantially aggrieved by the trial court's order because it requires him to provide legal services to mother at the state's approved hourly rate throughout the dependency and neglect proceedings. Accordingly, we conclude that he has standing to raise his claim in the context of this appeal, even though he is a nonparty and other procedural avenues may be available for him to pursue his claims. See, e.g., Waters v. Dist. Court, supra (court-appointed counsel filed petition for writ of mandamus compelling trial court to order payment of attorney fees and costs incurred in representation of indigent parent in dependency and neglect proceeding); McCall v. Dist. Court, 783 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1989)(Colorado State Public Defender filed original proceeding pursuant to C.A.R. 21 for review of trial court order denying attorney's motion to withdr
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