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Garby v. George Washington University Hospital10/27/2005
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This claim by my colleagues that Mrs. Garby's failure to argue for involuntary commitment defeats proximate cause originates entirely with the majority. In some twelve pages devoted to proximate cause in the brief for the defendants, there is not the slightest suggestion of such a contention. The trial judge's brief discussion of the issue of proximate cause likewise fails to connect the issue in any way with the theme that the majority has now adopted. This is not surprising, for if the failure to argue for involuntary commitment is relevant to any issue in the case other than whether Mr. Garby should have been involuntarily committed -- and, in my view, it is not -- it bears on whether there was a breach of the standard of care rather than on causation.
In any event, at least as I see it, involuntary commitment is a red herring. It diverts the inquiry from the specific negligence alleged by Mrs. Garby and from the foreseeable consequences of that negligence. An impartial jury, assessing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could reasonably find, as the plaintiff's expert opined, that the defendants breached the standard of care by placing Mr. Garby in the custody of a woman who knew nothing about his recent plan to jump off a bridge. As I endeavor to show in Part II of this opinion, a jury could likewise reasonably find that this conduct on the part of the defendants proximately and foreseeably resulted in the decedent's death.
I. THE STANDARD OF CARE AND ITS BREACH
Although the disagreement between the majority and myself centers on whether or not the evidence of causation was sufficient to go to the jury, that issue can most readily be understood in the context of the entire case. I therefore address each of the principal legal issues.
A. The Standard of Review
The question whether the trial judge properly directed a verdict in favor of a party is one of law. Phillips v. District of Columbia, 714 A.2d 768, 772 (D.C. 1998). Accordingly, this court owes no deference to the trial judge's ruling, and our review of his order is de novo. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Jeanty, 718 A.2d 172, 174 (D.C. 1998).
B. The JMOL Standard
Although my colleagues in the majority seem to attach little, if any, significance to the point, a trial court may grant judgment as a matter of law only where "a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50 (a). "On motion for a directed verdict, the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and that party . . . is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference from the evidence." Jeanty, 718 A.2d at 174; see also Bauman v. Sragow, 308 A.2d 243, 244 (D.C. 1973) (per curiam). "As long as there is some evidence from which jurors could reasonably find the necessary elements, a trial judge must not grant a directed verdict." Marshall v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 1374, 1379 (D.C. 1978); see also Abebe v. Benitez, 667 A.2d 834, 836 (D.C. 1995). Judgment as a matter of law should therefore be granted sparingly, and only in extreme cases. District of Columbia v. Wilson, 721 A.2d 591, 596 (D.C. 1998); King v. Pagliaro Bros. Stone Co., 703 A.2d 1232, 1234 (D.C. 1997). Finally, in ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the trial court "must take care to avoid weighing the evidence, passing on the credibility of witnesses or substituting its judgment for that of the jury." Pazmino v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 638 A.2d 677, 678 (D.C. 1994) (quoting Vuitch v. Furr, 482 A.2d 811, 81
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