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In re Bailey9/15/2005
o distribute the funds to the third party or withhold distribution.
Id. at 164 (citing D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15, Comment ). "In general, a 'just claim' that the lawyer must honor pursuant to Rule 1.15 is one that relates to the particular funds in the lawyer's possession, as opposed to merely being (or alleged to be) a general unsecured obligation of the client." Id. at 165. Examples of "just claims" include: (1) "an attachment or garnishment arising out of a money judgment against the client"; (2) "a statutory lien"; (3) "a court order relating to the specific funds in the lawyer's possession"; and (4) "a contractual agreement." Id. With respect to the fourth example, the reference is to "a contractual agreement made by the client and joined in or ratified by the lawyer to pay certain funds in the possession of the lawyer . . . to a third party . . . ." Id. This "type of agreement . . . is commonly known as an 'Authorization and Assignment.'" Id.
In the case before us, Dr. Garmon sent his own authorization form to Mr. Bailey and Ms. Haile for execution. His form is entitled, "Authorization for Release of Medical Records and Payment of Medical Expense." The question we confront is whether this authorization which does not mention the word "assignment," conveyed a property interest to Dr. Garmon in the settlement funds sent to Mr. Bailey. The hearing committee concluded that "a reasonable person in the position of the parties" would have understood that the authorization constituted an assignment of the settlement funds to Dr. Garmon. The Board disagreed, explaining that not only was the authorization not titled "assignment," but there was no language in the document that plainly stated or suggested that there was an assignment. Furthermore, the Board determined that the authorization did not create a lien as suggested by Bar Counsel, because the "lien" language in the authorization only referred to Dr. Garmon's services as an expert witness. Mr. Bailey agrees, maintaining that the authorization did not give Dr. Garmon a property interest in the settlement funds because it made no reference to a lien or assignment, except as it relates to Dr. Garmon's services as an expert witness. Instead, Mr. Bailey asserts that Dr. Garmon was merely a general creditor. On the other had, Bar Counsel argues that the plain language of the authorization created an interest in Ms. Haile's settlement proceeds even though it was not specifically labeled as an "authorization and assignment." Bar Counsel insists that the authorization "created legal rights in Dr. Garmon's favor, including interests, property, an assignment, and a lien, obligating [Mr. Bailey] to safeguard and promptly pay funds belonging to [Dr. Garmon]," and that the payment would derive from any funds, settlement or otherwise. In addition, Bar Counsel argues that Dr. Garmon did serve as an expert witness for Ms. Haile.
In analyzing the terms of the authorization we turn to our rules of contract interpretation. "In order to determine whether a contract provision has more than one reasonable interpretation, it is necessary to look at the 'face of the language itself, giving the language its plain meaning, without reference to any rules of construction.'" Capital City Mortgage Corp. v. Habana Vill. Art & Folklore, Inc., 747 A.2d 564, 567 (D.C. 2000) (quoting Sacks v. Rothberg, 569 A.2d 150, 154 (D.C. 1990)) (other citation omitted). "If the court finds that the contract has more than one reasonable interpretation and therefore is ambiguous, then the court - after admitting probative extrinsic evidence - must 'determine what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought the disputed language meant.'" Id. (quoting I
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