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Childs v. Purll9/8/2005
s a matter of law that appellants' misrepresentation claims cannot be pursued under the Consumer Protection Procedures Act because those claims (1) seek damages for personal injury of a tortious nature and (2) arise in the context of landlord-tenant relations.
In 1991, when appellants' misrepresentation cause of action arose, § 28-3905 (k)(1) provided as follows:
Any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment by any person of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District of Columbia within the jurisdiction of the Department [of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs] may bring an action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to recover or obtain any of the following:
(A) treble damages;
(B) reasonable attorneys' fees;
(C) punitive damages;
(D) any other relief which the court deems proper.
D.C. Code § 28-3905 (k)(1) (1991) (emphasis added). We have construed the italicized language to mean that where the Act limits the jurisdiction of the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, "the scope of the cause of action created by § 28-3905 (k)(1) is similarly limited." Diamond v. Davis, 680 A.2d 364, 365-66 n.2 (D.C. 1996).
The Act limits the jurisdiction of the Department in a number of substantive ways; of pertinence to the present case, the Act specifically states that the Department may not (1) "order damages for personal injury of a tortious nature," or (2) "apply the [complaint adjudication] provisions of section 28-3905 to . . . landlord-tenant relations; . . ." D.C. Code § 28-3903 (c). It follows from Diamond that former § 28-3905 (k)(1) is subject to the same substantive limitations, i.e., it does not authorize a private action in Superior Court where the claim (1) seeks damages for personal injury of a tortious nature, or (2) arose in the context of landlord-tenant relations.
The Council of the District of Columbia amended § 28-3905 (k)(1) in October 2000 (after appellants filed their lawsuit) so that the subsection no longer explicitly links the scope of private civil actions to the jurisdiction of the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs. We need not decide, however, whether the Council intended thereby to expand the private right of action, for even if it did, there is no indication that the Council intended any such expansion to be retroactive. See Mayo v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 738 A.2d 807, 811 (D.C. 1999) (" retrospective operation will not be given to a statute . . . unless such be the unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); District of Columbia v. Gallagher, 734 A.2d 1087, 1093 (D.C. 1999) (" tatutes are not to be given retroactive effect or construed to change the status of claims fixed in accordance with earlier provisions unless the legislative purpose so to do plainly appears.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See generally Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264-80 (1994).
As we conclude that appellants' Consumer Protection Procedures Act claims are subject to the limitations inherent in former D.C. Code § 28-3905 (k)(1), we affirm the trial court's decision to award summary judgment on those claims to the defendants. The claims are precluded because they purport to apply the Act to a transaction that arose in a landlord-tenant relationship, and because they seek damages for personal injuries of a tortious nature.
C. The Individual Willoughby Defendants
As an additional reason for granting summary judgment to Lawrence, David and Robert Willoughby, the trial court ruled that a
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