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Nuyen v. Luna10/13/2005
the present judge in this case." In addition to reiterating Nuyen's position that he had received no notice of the pretrial conference, Nuyen's counsel added a new argument. He contended that the doctrine of res judicata barred the default judgment because the settlement in the civil action had necessarily resolved Luna's counterclaims in the landlord-tenant action.
On October 29, 2003, the trial court denied Nuyen's motion to vacate the default judgment "for good cause shown," without further explanation. On the same date, the trial court, pursuant to the settlement, dismissed with prejudice Luna's claims in the civil action. This timely appeal followed.
II. Analysis
A. Appeal from the Default Judgment
Nuyen's notice of appeal states that Nuyen appeals from the order denying the motion to vacate default judgment. Nevertheless, Nuyen makes several arguments attacking the trial court's default judgment itself. He argues, among other things, that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a default judgment as a sanction, and that the amount of punitive damages is so disproportionate to the amount of rent abatement as to deny him due process of law. Luna contends that these arguments are not available to Nuyen because he did not file a notice of appeal from the default judgment, but noted an appeal only from the order denying Nuyen's motion to vacate. We conclude, for reasons somewhat different from those Luna offers, that Luna is correct.
Our analysis begins with the proposition that the timely filing of a [Super. Ct. Civ.] Rule 59 (e) motion . . . tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal from the original judgment, so that the time for noting such an appeal begins to run again from the entry of the order disposing of the Rule 59 (a) motion.
White v. Sargent, 875 A.2d 658, 662 (D.C. 2005). See D.C. Ct. App. R. 4 (a)(iii).
In White, one of the appellants appealed from an order denying a motion to reconsider an order granting summary judgment. She did not, however, appeal the order granting summary judgment itself. The court nevertheless held that, since the motion to reconsider was a timely filed motion pursuant to Rule 59 (e), the appeal "encompass not only the denial of the Rule 59 (e) motion but the original judgment as well . . . ." Id. Likewise, Nuyen's appeal encompasses not only the order denying the motion to vacate default judgment but also the order granting the default judgment, so long as his motion was a Rule 59 (e) motion and so long as it was timely filed. Luna concedes that the motion was timely filed within ten days of the entry of the default judgment, as required by Rule 59 (e). Accordingly, we turn to the question whether Nuyen's motion was a Rule 59 (e) motion.
Nuyen explicitly premised his pro se motion on Rule 59. Rule 59 (e) provides that a motion "to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of judgment." Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60 (b), however, also would have been a basis for granting Nuyen the relief he sought. That rule allows a court, upon a motion timely filed, to "relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding," and, although a Rule 60 (b) motion is not required to be filed within ten days, it may be. See United States v. $23,000 in U.S. Currency, 356 F.3d 157, 164-65 & n.9 (1st Cir. 2004) (construing motion filed within ten days of final judgment as Rule 60 (b) motion). The nature of a motion does not turn on its caption or label, but rather its substance. We have noted that because Rules 59 (e) and 60 (b) "overlap . . . , it is not always clear whether a particular motion constitutes a Rule 59 (e) motion or a Rule 60 (
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