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Nuyen v. Luna10/13/2005
gs; (2) acted in good faith; (3) took prompt action; and (4) presented an adequate defense. Prejudice to the non-moving party is also relevant.
Starling v. Jephunneh Lawrence & Assocs., 495 A.2d 1157, 1159-60 (D.C. 1985).
We review the trial court's denial of a motion to vacate default judgment for abuse of discretion. There exists a "strong judicial policy favoring adjudication on the merits of a case." Walker v. Smith, 499 A.2d 446, 448-49 (D.C. 1985). (Citations omitted.) In exercising its discretion, the trial court must weigh that policy against " strong policy favoring the finality of judgments . . . ." Clay v. Deering, 618 A.2d 92, 94 (D.C. 1992). Because judicial policy favors decision on the merits, however, "even a slight abuse of discretion in refusing to set aside a judgment may justify reversal." Starling, supra, 495 A.2d at 1159.
In Starling, supra, 495 A.2d at 1162, we stated:
This court has long emphasized that the trial court has a responsibility to inquire where matters are raised which might entitle the movant to relief under Rule 60 (b).
We reiterated this point in Reid v. District of Columbia, 634 A.2d 423, 425 (D.C. 1993), where we reversed the denial of a motion to vacate a dismissal of a complaint. In that case, the trial court denied the motion "'for the reasons stated in the defendant's opposition.'" Id. We concluded:
A review of the record indicates that in denying appellants' motion to reinstate the case, the trial court did not consider the factors enumerated in either Rule 60 (b)(1) or in Starling. There was no inquiry by the trial court into whether appellants' counsel's actions constituted mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect which would justify setting aside the order of dismissal. Moreover, there was no inquiry into whether appellants had actual notice of the proceedings, acted in good faith, and took prompt action; nor was there any inquiry as to possible prejudice to the non-moving party or a recognition by the trial court of "evidence in the record reflecting unjustified delays, or noncompliance with the court rules, attributable to the appellant . . . ."
Id. (citations omitted). See also Johnson v. Lustine Realty Co., 640 A.2d 708, 709 (D.C. 1994) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by not making the necessary inquiry and in failing to address two factors that bore directly on the Rule 60 (b) motion). The failure to inquire into the factors bearing on a motion to vacate "too heavily tip the scales in favor of the need for finality in litigation." Walker, supra, 499 A.2d at 449.
In his motion, Nuyen asserted that he did not receive notice of the pretrial conference. He claimed that he had attempted to file an opposition to the motion for default judgment. His motion was filed on July 14, about three weeks from the date on which the judgment was entered. On this record the trial court might reasonably find that Nuyen failed to receive notice of the pretrial conference, took prompt action to remedy his failure to attend it, and acted in good faith. The trial court's order, however, provides no indication that it inquired into these factors, all of which bore on the exercise of its discretion.
Luna argues, among other things, that Nuyen himself was responsible for his failure to receive notice of the pretrial because he did not notify the court of his prison address, and argues that his imprisonment would have prevented his participation in the pretrial conference in any event. As evidence of bad faith, she points to Nuyen's failure to arrange for the prosecution of his case during his two-year imprisonment, his violation of di
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