 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Nuyen v. Luna10/13/2005
scovery rules, and his failure to file an opposition to the motion for default judgment. She claims prejudice because Nuyen's conduct delayed her trial, thereby jeopardizing her ability to present evidence and delaying a judgment that would return to her sorely needed rental payments.
Because the trial court denied the motion to vacate without stating its reasons, we need not evaluate the strength of Nuyen's and Luna's arguments. The trial court has the responsibility, in the exercise of its discretion, to consider the facts in light of the factors pertinent to a motion to vacate a default judgment. "In exercising its discretion, the trial court must choose 'what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law' and state the reasons which support its conclusion." Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Belts, 455 A.2d 908, 909 (D.C. 1983) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 361 (D.C. l979)).
Luna makes one argument, however, that arguably warrants our sustaining the trial court's judgment without a remand. She argues that Nuyen did not present an adequate defense. A motion under Rule 60 (b) must offer a "sufficient elaboration of the facts . . . to permit the trial court to conclude whether the defense, if found to be true, is adequate."
Tennille v. Tennille, 791 A.2d 79, 83 (D.C. 2002). More than a "bald allegation" is required to adequately state a prima facie defense under Rule 60 (b), Clark v. Moler, 418 A.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C. 1980), and notice pleading principles are not applicable. Brady v. Graham, 611 A.2d 534, 536 (D.C. l992). The movant need not, however, show a likelihood of success on the merits. Clark, supra, 418 A.2d at 1043. Rather, the movant needs to "provide the [trial] court with reason to believe that vacating the judgment will not be an empty exercise or a futile gesture." Murray v. District of Columbia, 311 U.S. App. D.C. 204, 206, 52 F.3d 353, 355 (1995).
If the trial court had been presented only with Nuyen's counsel's proffer of a meritorious defense, we would have no trouble sustaining the judgment. In his supplement to his client's motion to vacate, counsel argued that res judicata barred entry of the default judgment. Nuyen presses the same argument in this court. This argument could not have been sustained by the trial court.
Where there has been a final judgment on the merits of a claim, the doctrine of res judicata "precludes relitigation in a subsequent proceeding of all issues arising out of the same cause of action between the same parties or their privies, whether or not the issues were raised in the first trial." Faulkner v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 618 A.2d 181, 183 (D.C. 1992). The doctrine applies only where the issues in the prior and subsequent action arise out of the same cause of action. Id. Nuyen, through counsel, argued below that Luna's counterclaim in the landlord-tenant action and her complaint in the civil action arose out of the same cause of action. Therefore, he argued, Luna's counterclaim in the landlord-tenant action was necessarily resolved by the settlement. Nuyen renews these arguments here.
We need not address the issue of whether Luna's counterclaim and her civil action complaint arose out of the same cause of action. Even if they did, the parties made clear in their settlement agreement that the agreement pertained only to the complaint for personal injuries and did not limit or otherwise alter or affect any rights, claims, causes or defenses of the parties in the Landlord Tenant action . . . . and that said L & T action shall continue unhindered, unimpeded, and without any limitation to the causes or defenses asserted therein, notwithstanding the execution of this agreement
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 District of Columbia Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|