 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
In re Wright10/20/2005
of the respondent's behavior in the aggregate. See, e.g., In re Lyles, 680 A.2d 408 (D.C. 1996); In re Ryan, 670 A.2d 375 (D.C. 1996); In re Washington, 541 A.2d 1276, 1283 (D.C. 1988); In re Hines, 482 A.2d at 383.
Considering respondent's behavior in the aggregate, we are well satisfied that the Board's recommended sanction is warranted and is by no means overly severe. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9 (g)(1). A one-year suspension with reinstatement conditioned on a showing of fitness and restitution is consistent with the discipline we have imposed in other cases involving a comparable pattern of dishonesty, neglect, lack of responsibility to clients, and deficient trust account record keeping. See, e.g., In re Tinsley, 582 A.2d 1192, 1195 (D.C. 1990); see also In re Grimes, 687 A.2d 198 (D.C. 1996); In re Chisholm, 679 A.2d at 505; In re O'Donnell, 517 A.2d 1069 (D.C. 1986); In re Fogel, 422 A.2d 966 (D.C. 1980); In re Smith, 403 A.2d 296, 303-04 (D.C. 1979). As to the requirement of restitution to the third party medical providers, see In re Bettis, 855 A.2d 282, 289-90 (D.C. 2004).
Accordingly, respondent Ronald A. Wright is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year, with reinstatement to be conditioned upon (1) a showing by respondent that he has been rehabilitated and is fit to practice law in the District of Columbia, and (2) proof that respondent has made restitution as follows: (a) $300 to former client Carolyn Pyatt with six percent interest from October 21, 1999; (b) $2,705 to Washington Physical Medicine Center with six percent interest from June 14, 1999; and (c) $320 to Dr. Michael Redlich with six percent interest from March 3, 1998. Respondent's suspension shall become effective thirty days after the date of this order.
So ordered.
NEWMAN, Senior Judge, concurring
I join the court's opinion and write to express a personal view. I am well aware of the provisions of D.C. Bar R.XI, § 9 (g)(1), which require us to defer to the Board on quantum of discipline "unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent discipline for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted." Having been Chief Judge at the time of the adoption of this provision (and a proponent thereof), I am well aware of the Rule's "legislative history." I write separately to repeat here what I said during oral argument: the undisputed facts in this case push my "deference" to the Board to the outer limit. I fully understand Bar Counsel's view that the recommended sanction is "incredibly lenient." It is with confidence that the Board will take a "hard look" at the "fitness" criteria when Wright applies for reinstatement that I concur.
Page 1 2 District of Columbia Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|