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Laprade v. Rosinsky9/1/2005
he letter of the Office of the Secretary, LaPrade submitted an affidavit, as did her husband. The record on appeal does not include the affidavit of LaPrade's husband. LaPrade's affidavit of April 28, 1986, stated that Stamback personally observed the signatures of the Rosinskys when she notarized the May 1976 deed, but gave no indication that LaPrade had personal knowledge that Stamback did so. LaPrade further stated that she made the first few payments on the mortgage on the property, and that the Rosinskys did not retain Bradley to contest title to LaPrade's one-half interest until after LaPrade declined to sign a loan agreement through which the Rosinskys would finance the remodeling of their kitchen. The order of the Office of the Secretary states that Stamback testified that she and Mr. LaPrade went to the property to notarize some documents and found that only Ms. Rosinsky was at home, and that she witnessed the signature of Ms. Rosinsky at the property and later that day the signature of Mr. Rosinsky at the office of John LaPrade. The Office of the Secretary credited the testimony of the Rosinskys over the testimony of Stamback and the affidavits of LaPrade and her husband, and found that Mr. Rosinsky did not sign the deed, and that Stamback falsely notarized the signature of Mr. Rosinsky by certifying the signature of Mrs. Rosinsky as Mr. Rosinsky's "act and deed." The Office of the Secretary issued an order on November 2, 1987, denying Stamback's application for reappointment as a notary public, but made no conclusion as to the validity of the deed.
LaPrade filed the instant action against the Rosinskys in November 2000, alleging breach of contract and seeking an order partitioning the property. In their answer, appellees raised various defenses including laches, statute of limitations and fraud, and advanced the counterclaims identified above. LaPrade moved for summary judgment on all counts of her complaint and all of the Rosinskys' counterclaims. The Rosinskys then filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on LaPrade's claims. The Rosinskys alleged that the May deed was void on the grounds that Mr. Rosinsky did not sign, or authorize Mrs. Rosinsky to sign, the deed and that the execution of the deed was not actually witnessed by the notary public. In support of her motion for summary judgment and her opposition to the Rosinskys' cross-motion, LaPrade offered the affidavit she had submitted to the Office of the Secretary in 1986.
The trial court granted the Rosinskys' motion for summary judgment. It ruled, inter alia, that LaPrade's action for damages for breach of contract was barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, D.C. Code ยง 12-301 (7) (1981), and that LaPrade was not entitled to partition as the deed that would have vested a one-half interest in the property in LaPrade was void because Mr. Rosinsky did not sign it or authorize Mrs. Rosinsky to do so in his behalf. Accordingly, the trial court went on to deny LaPrade's motion for summary judgment on the counts of her complaint, granted the Rosinskys' cross-motion for summary judgment on those counts, and dismissed as moot the Rosinskys' counterclaims asserting adverse possession and constructive trust, and seeking to quiet title. In addition, the court ruled that the Rosinskys had failed to establish a prima facie case for their counterclaims for slander of title and punitive damages, and granted LaPrade's motion for summary judgment on those counts. As a result, the only claim that survived the trial court's rulings on the cross-motions for summary judgment was the Rosinskys' action for an accounting. Later, the Rosinskys voluntarily dismissed it. This appeal followed.
II.
The
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