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McCamey v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Employment Services11/10/2005
ry, the court did not distinguish between "physical-mental" and "mental-mental" claims. Rather, the decision simply refers throughout to "emotional" injuries.
The court's reliance on the Agency's interpretation also is not compelling. . . .
As a division of the court we are required to follow our decision in Porter. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971). We cannot simply rule that the court in that case did not understand the issues. Moreover, in Landesberg, 794 A.2d at 614, this court reiterated and relied on its decision in Porter in reaching the same result in a somewhat similar factual scenario.
We do not suggest that Ms. McCamey’s position, grounded in the apparent unrestricted language of the statute and the broad remedial character of our workers’ compensation scheme, is implausible in principle. Some courts in other jurisdictions have upheld claims comparable to hers. See generally 3 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION Law § 56.04 (3) (2005). Indeed, we have held that the statute reaches the aggravation of an employee’s physical condition resulting from workplace injuries. But in light of Porter and Landesberg, as well as McEvily and other authorities cited in Porter, Ms. McCamey’s position, though ably and conscientiously presented, founders upon our precedents, and it cannot prevail unless those precedents are overruled by the court sitting en banc. Accordingly, the decision of the Director is
Affirmed.
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