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Mason v. Network of Wilmington7/1/2005 inder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor," or (2) " ithout receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor . . . ntended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they became due."
Mason decided not to pursue her fraudulent conveyance claim against Temps. She continues to maintain, however, that Schlecker received assets from Personnel without paying equivalent value for them. While, in fairness to Schlecker, this argument was not briefed thoroughly, the Complaint does allege that " he property and assets of [Personnel] were fraudulently transferred to . . . Barry Schlecker." There are sufficient facts in the record to infer rationally that, with regard to Personnel's assets (however limited) remaining after the sale to Temps, Schlecker obtained those assets without providing equivalent (or any) consideration to Personnel. For example, with regard to Personnel's former phone number that was scheduled to be sold to Temps, Network uses this phone number and a reasonable inference from Schlecker's deposition is that the phone number, although scheduled to be sold, was not actually transferred to Temps (and thus remained an asset of Personnel) and was later transferred to Schlecker from Personnel without consideration. Other assets-perhaps office furniture and an automobile-may fall in that category as well. As to the mens rea aspect of the Fraudulent Transfer Act, Schlecker knew of the Mason's claim against his corporation and whether Personnel was, or was about to become, insolvent presents an issue of material fact. Therefore, Schlecker's motion for summary judgment as to the claim of fraudulent transfer of assets to him is denied (Count I of the Complaint).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is entered in Network's favor (Count III of the Complaint). Summary judgment is also granted in favor of Schlecker on the piercing the corporate veil claim (Count II of the Complaint). Schlecker's motion is denied as to the fraudulent transfer claim (Count I of the Complaint) which challenges the distribution of Personnel's assets to him. It follows that Mason's motion for summary judgment is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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