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Taylor v. Magana10/5/2005
that there was no evidence establishing a lack of due diligence on the part of their attorney because the jury questionnaire asked specific questions regarding past litigation and Hill answered the questions in the negative, which was apparently clear to the parties and the trial court because no further inquiry was conducted. We agree.
It is clear that the trial judge applied the wrong standard in determining whether juror Hill's misconduct violated the second prong of De La Rosa, i.e., that the juror concealed the information which was relevant and material to his jury service. As we stated above, "a juror's nondisclosure need not be intentional to constitute concealment," because the impact remains the same, counsel is prevented from making an informed judgment regarding the composition of the jury and the utilization of his or her peremptory challenges. Roberts, 814 So. 2d at 343. It is clear that the trial judge mistakenly concluded that the concealment must be purposeful and the application of this incorrect standard played a significant role in her conclusion not to grant a new trial.
Magana concedes the information not revealed was in fact relevant and material. The information concealed was that juror Hill and his mother were being sued as defendants in a personal injury action and juror Hill believed the plaintiff in the action against him was represented by the very lawyer that represented the plaintiff in the instant case. It was also revealed during the juror interview that the case against juror Hill and his mother was scheduled to go to trial within a couple of weeks of when the voir dire was conducted. Whether juror Hill purposely concealed this information is irrelevant. Juror Hill's statement during the juror interview that "Maybe I didn't understand, that's why. To me it was over," does not alter Hill's responsibility to reveal the information. His mere profession of not understanding does not negate the concealment test. It is hard to imagine what it was juror Hill could not understand about the questionnaire given to him and his fellow jurors by the trial judge. The questionnaire included the following specific questions:
Have you or any member of your immediate family ever been a party to a lawsuit? Yes __________ No
If yes, were you or your immediate family member a:
9a. Plaintiff (Did you or your immediate family member bring the lawsuit?); __________
9b. Defendant (Was the lawsuit brought against you or immediate family member?). __________
10. Has a claim for personal injury ever been made against you or any member of your family? Yes __________ No
11. Have you or any member of your family ever made a claim for personal injuries? Yes __________ No __________
These questions are very specific, unambiguous, and not cluttered with sophisticated or confusing legalese.
The claim against juror Hill and his mother for personal injury was scheduled to go to trial within two weeks of his jury service and at the time of voir dire was believed by juror Hill to be prosecuted by Taylor's attorney, Stewart Williams. If under the facts of this case, the failure of juror Hill to disclose this information does not constitute concealment, then the second prong of the De La Rosa test is meaningless.
In addition to finding that the concealment by Hill was not purposeful, the trial judge also concluded that juror Hill's conduct did not rise to the level of requiring a new trial because his response about the litigation history was ambiguous and Taylor's counsel did not establish that Hill's failure to disclose information concerning his prior litigation was not at
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