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Blom v. Adventist Health System/Sunbelt9/23/2005
rning whether the pre-suit requirements of Chapter 766 have been met in a particular case. See, e.g., St. Mary's Hosp. v. Bell, 785 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Pearlstein v. Malunney, 500 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Usually such cases as this reach us because the trial court has dismissed the claim for non-compliance. Here, however, the trial court merely abated the cause at the request of Ms. Blom, pending completion of the pre-suit process. As her case was not dismissed, we fail to see how she suffered an irreparable injury. Complying with pre-suit will not cause an injury that cannot be addressed on plenary appeal. If there is no irreparable injury, she fails to meet that requirement for certiorari relief.
Perhaps more importantly, we find no departure by the actions of the trial court from the essential requirements of law. Chapter 766 requires persons seeking to file a complaint for medical negligence to first notify each prospective defendant in the manner prescribed by statute of his or her intent to initiate litigation. Whether a person is required to comply with the pre-suit procedures outlined in Chapter 766 is fundamentally fact-dependent. An inquiry to determine the applicability of the pre-suit process should begin with the statutory definition of a "claim for medical negligence." See Foshee v. Health Management Asso., 675 So. 2d 957, 959 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 686 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1996). See also Robbins v. Orlando, H.M.A., Inc., 683 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Chapter 766 defines such a claim as one "arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." Thus, the trial court is first tasked with the responsibility of determining whether the claim arises out of the rendering or failure to render medical care or services. Id. Here, the trial court determined that the ultimate facts contained in the complaint fell within that definition, and that Ms. Blom was required to comply.
It is undoubtedly true that some injuries suffered in a medical facility or inflicted by medical personnel do not arise out of the rendering or failure to render medical care or services. A clear example is offered by St. Mary's Hosp. v. Bell, 785 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), where a patient's foot was injured by an employee as a result of simple negligence. See also Lake Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Clarke, 768 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). It is also true that some claims for false imprisonment arising out of Baker Act detentions may likewise fail to meet the definition of medical negligence, and thus, not implicate the pre-suit requirements. See, e.g., Foshee; Everett v. Florida Inst. of Tech., 503 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 5th DCA), dismissed, 511 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1987). We agree with the trial court, however, that the allegations of detention made by Ms. Blom place her claim within the lap of medical negligence.
Ms. Blom asserts in her complaint that Dr. Lonsdorfer was "acting in the scope of his position as an emergency room physician" at the hospital run by Adventist at the time that he allegedly committed the tortious act of committing her. Once having been committed, she then alleges that hospital personnel mistreated her in a variety of ways. All of these actions, however, arose out of the purportedly improper mental health commitment that was based on the physician's medical diagnosis that Ms. Blom met the criteria set forth in the Baker Act. This appears to us to be a claim arising out of the rendering of medical care. As one of the requirements for certiorari relief is that the lower court must have departed from the essential requirements of law in rendering its order -- a high burden to meet -- and as the abatement order of the trial court in
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