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St. Paul Reinsurance Co.9/28/2005
owever, the June 13, 2000 Order did not spell out the dollar amount that was subject to garnishment. On April 18, 2003, the trial court entered a new order stating that it had reconsidered its June 13, 2000 Order and had "found that order to be final." The trial court went on to state for the first time in an order that the Rosses were entitled to collect $300,000 from St. Paul, the liability policy limit. The trial court subsequently ordered post- judgment interest on the $300,000, running from June 13, 2000.
On May 19, 2003, St. Paul filed an application for discretionary review with this Court, arguing that it had timely appealed from the true final judgment entered by the trial court on April 18, 2003. We granted St. Paul's discretionary application. The Rosses filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that St. Paul's application was untimely because final judgment had been entered on June 13, 2000 and St. Paul was estopped from arguing otherwise. We denied the Rosses' motion to dismiss.
On appeal, St. Paul argued in Case No. A03A2304 that the trial court erred by (a) holding that the Rosses had standing to pursue St. Paul in a garnishment action; (b) finding that the assault and battery exclusion did not bar coverage of the shooting; and (c) awarding post- judgment interest running from June 13, 2000, since no final judgment had been entered on that date. The Rosses cross appealed in Case No. A05A2305, contending that the trial court erred in its award of interest because (a) interest should have run from entry of the June 29, 1999 consent judgment in the underlying personal injury action, and (b) interest should have been calculated on the amount of the consent judgment ($500,000), not the liability policy limit ($300,000). The appeal and cross appeal were consolidated before this Court.
With two panel members dissenting, this Court held that the Rosses did not have standing to pursue St. Paul in a garnishment action and, therefore, that the remaining enumerations of error set forth in the appeal and cross appeal were moot. St. Paul Reinsurance Co., 266 Ga. App. at 78-79. However, in a footnote, this Court did reiterate that the June 13, 2000 Order did not constitute a final judgment because it "left the amount of garnishment unresolved." Id. at 77, n.1.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and stated that it was particularly concerned with two questions: whether this Court had jurisdiction to hear St. Paul's application for discretionary review, and whether the Rosses had standing to bring a garnishment action against St. Paul. In its subsequent opinion, the Supreme Court remained silent on the jurisdictional issue and discussed only whether the Rosses had standing, expressly reversing this Court on that issue. See Ross, 279 Ga. at 92-94.
We now address the remaining enumerations of error set forth in St. Paul's appeal and the Rosses' cross appeal that have been reopened by the Supreme Court's decision. In particular, we consider whether the trial court erred in its decision that the assault and battery exclusion did not bar coverage of the shooting under the liability policy and in its award of post-judgment interest.
1. St. Paul argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the assault and battery exclusion did not bar coverage of Ross' shooting under the liability policy. The trial court reached its conclusion in the context of an evidentiary hearing on St. Paul's motion for summary judgment and the Rosses' traverse. See Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Dunn, 269 Ga. 213, 215 (496 SE2d 696) (1998) (discussing test for determining whether insurance policy exclusion applies); Eady v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 232 Ga. App. 711, 714 (502 SE2d
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