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Donnalley v. Sterling7/13/2005
ake.
In denying summary judgment on this claim the trial court stated that it could not "find as a matter of law that Daniel Sterling was not a third-party beneficiary of the contract." The trial judge stated that the language of the contract -- in particular, the use of the pronoun "we" when referring to the party renting the camp -- made it appear as if Donnalley entered into the contract on behalf of the entire Wheeler Football Team. From this language, the judge inferred an intent to confer a direct benefit upon the members of the football team, including Daniel Sterling. We disagree.
"In order for a third party to have standing to enforce a contract . . . it must clearly appear from the contract that it was intended for his or her benefit. The mere fact that the third party would benefit from performance of the agreement is not alone sufficient." (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Culberson v. Fulton- DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 201 Ga. App. 347, 349 (1) (d) (411 SE2d 75) (1991). Accordingly, " lthough the third-party beneficiary does not need to be specifically named in the contract, the contracting parties' intention to benefit the third party must be shown on the face of the contract." (Citation omitted.) Brown v. All-Tech Inv. Group, 265 Ga. App. 889, 897 (2) (a) (i) (595 SE2d 517) (2000). See also Satilla Community Serv. Bd. v. Satilla Health Servs., 275 Ga. 805, 810 (2) (573 SE2d 31) (2002). Thus, "in personal injury cases, an injured party may not recover as a third-party beneficiary for failure to perform a duty imposed by a contract unless it is apparent from the language of the agreement that the contracting parties intended to confer a direct benefit upon the plaintiff to protect him from physical injury" (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Armor Elevator Co. v. Hinton, 213 Ga. App. 27, 30 (2) (443 SE2d 670) (1994).
Applying these principles, we recently held that an inmate injured on a work detail was not a third-party beneficiary to a contract between Stone Mountain Memorial Association and the Department of Corrections. Gay v. Dept. of Corrections, 270 Ga. App. 17, 22-24 (2) (606 SE2d 53) (2004). Although that contract required the Association to provide a safe workplace for inmate work details and to furnish safety gear, we held that these provisions did not evidence an intent to benefit the inmates directly as the Association did not agree to render any specifically identified performance to the inmates. Instead, we found that any benefit to the inmates was merely incidental to the contract. Id. See also Anderson v. Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, 273 Ga. 113, 118 (4) (537 SE2d 345) (2000) (park visitors not third-party beneficiaries of security contract between security company and Olympic committee); Brown v. All-Tech Investment Group, 265 Ga. App. at 897, 900 (2) (a) (i), (2) (b) (tenant's visitors not third-party beneficiaries to contracts between tenant and property manager and property manager and security service provider).
Similarly, we find that any benefit to Daniel Sterling from the rental contract was merely incidental and did not render him a third- party beneficiary to the contract. It is clear that the contract, when read as a whole, was intended to delineate the relative duties and responsibilities of the parties. The form agreement designates the time and length of the rental, the rental fee and divides responsibilities between the Athens "Y" Camp and the Wheeler Football Team. After assigning responsibilities for meals and cleaning of the facilities, the contract provides, in pertinent part:
4) We will be responsible for administering First Aid along with supplying the needed medical supplies. Also
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