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Gates v. Navy7/6/2005
ghway within any highway construction or maintenance area indicated by official traffic control devices." OCGA § 40-6-75 (a). The trial court then charged the jury on negligence per se: "The plaintiff contends that the defendant violated certain laws or ordinances. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the defendant failed to yield to the plaintiff who was working on the roadway. Such a violation would be called negligence per se, or negligence as a matter of law."
"It is well established that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error." Wadkins v. Smallwood, 243 Ga. App. 134, 139 (5) (530 SE2d 498) (2000). "The trial court's failure to give a jury charge in the exact language requested is not error where the charges actually given substantially cover the principles contained in the request." (Footnote omitted.) Nails v. Rebhan, 246 Ga. App. 19, 22 (3) (538 SE2d 843) (2000). We find the trial court's charge substantially covered the principles contained in Gate's request to charge. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's omission.
3. Gates contends the trial court erred in refusing two of his requests to charge the jury. Gates contends the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury that "the driver of a motor vehicle has no right to assume that the road ahead of him is clear of pedestrians, and he must maintain a diligent outlook therefor ." See Young v. Kitchens, 228 Ga. App. 870, 873 (3) (492 SE2d 898) (1997). He also contends the trial court erred in refusing his request to charge the following:
n order for a party to be liable for negligence, it is not necessary that they should have been able to anticipate the particular consequences, which ensued. It is sufficient if, in ordinary prudence, they might have foreseen some injury, which would result from their act or omission and that consequences, of a generally injurious nature, might result.
See Bayshore Co. v. Pruitt, 175 Ga. App. 679, 680 (1) (334 SE2d 213) (1985). When the trial court refused to give the two charges, Gates' counsel excepted. He argued that the charges were necessary and appropriate in this case because Navy had indicated that he had not seen Gates on the side of the road before he hit Gates, and there was evidence that Navy had not been watching where he was going as he drove through the construction site.
"The specific grounds advanced at trial for objection or exception to a charge control the extent of appellate review of the charge." Continental Research Corp. v. Reeves, 204 Ga. App. 120, 129 (5) (419 SE2d 48) (1992). "In order for a refusal to charge to be error, the requests must be . . . adjusted to the pleadings, law, and evidence, and not otherwise covered in the general charge." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Locke v. Vonalt, 189 Ga. App. 783, 787 (4) (377 SE2d 696) (1989).
In light of these principles, we find no error in the trial court's refusal to give the charges requested by Gates. The first requested charge related to Navy's duty of care and was not adjusted to the specific facts of this case. The trial court properly charged the jury regarding Navy's duty of care; the trial court charged the jury that a driver has a duty to yield the right of way to "authorized pedestrians actually engaged in work upon the highway . . ." "Reversible error will not be found in the refusal of the trial court to give a charge which, while constituting a correct statement of an abstract principle of law, was not adjusted to the evidence introduced at trial" (Citation omitted.) Campbell v. Cozad, 207 Ga. App. 175 (1) (427 SE2d 515) (1993). The second requested charge provided an
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