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Davis v. Standifer10/11/2005
eged misconduct contained in the original complaint, however, remained unchanged.
After hearing oral argument from the parties, the trial court entered an order granting the appellees' respective motions to dismiss pursuant to the GTCA. Davis now appeals from that order, contending that the trial court improperly dismissed her state common law and constitutional claims, as well as her federal constitutional claims.
1. State Law Claims
Davis argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her state law claims pursuant to the GTCA because the allegations of her amended complaint show that Standifer is not entitled to official immunity and that GSP and DPS are not entitled to sovereign immunity. "We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss under the de novo standard of review." BankWest, Inc. v. Oxendine, 266 Ga. App. 771, 776-777 (3) (598 SE2d 343) (2004). Our review leads us to conclude that the trial court committed no error.
(a) State Law Claims Alleged Against Standifer
The GTCA "exempts state officers and employees from liability for any torts committed while acting within the scope of their official duties or employment." Ridley v. Johns, 274 Ga. 241, 242 (552 SE2d 853) (2001). See OCGA ยง 50- 21-25 (a). The scope of the exemption has been construed broadly: "Where the state employee acts in the prosecution and within the scope of [his official duties], intentional wrongful conduct comes within and remains within the scope of employment." (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Feist v. Dirr, 271 Ga. App. 169, 172 (1) (b) (609 SE2d 111) (2004). See also Ridley, 274 Ga. at 242. Even where the plaintiff alleges a state constitutional violation, if the "underlying conduct complained of is tortious" and occurred within the scope of the state employee's official duties, the employee is protected by official immunity under the GTCA. Premo v. Ga. Port Auth., 227 Ga. App. 27, 29 (4) (488 SE2d 106) (1997).
Guided by these principles, we turn to the allegations in Davis' complaint as amended. Davis' amended complaint alleges that Standifer, a GSP patrol officer, was an employee of the State of Georgia. Furthermore, Davis' complaint, even as amended, explicitly states that the alleged sexual assault occurred during the course of a traffic stop of Davis' vehicle carried out by Standifer. Since the only alleged contact and interaction between Davis and Standifer occurred during the traffic stop, Davis' amended complaint clearly alleges facts showing that the sexual assault "arose from the performance of [Standifer's] official duties as a [patrol] officer." Mattox v. Bailey, 221 Ga. App. 546 (1) (472 SE2d 130) (1996) (holding that state correctional officer acted within scope of his official duties and thus was entitled to official immunity when officer allegedly beat inmate while escorting inmate across prison grounds). See also Ridley, 274 Ga. at 242 (holding that supervisor who allegedly harassed female employee was entitled to official immunity because the intentional misconduct occurred during the performance of the supervisor's official duties). Standifer, therefore, is cloaked with official immunity from suit.
It is true that Davis' amended complaint added a new alternative allegation stating simply that the misconduct occurred while Standifer was acting in his individual capacity outside the scope of his official duties as a patrol officer. However, " erely styling a suit against a public officer as one brought against him personally does not deprive him of any immunity to which he might otherwise be entitled for his official acts under the [GTCA]. (Citations omitted.) Coultas v. Dunbar, 220 Ga. App. 54, 58 (467 SE2d 37
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