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Talton v. Arnall Golden Gregory9/29/2005
ation that AGG participated in the procurement, processing, or distribution of the infected tissue. See Boyce v. Gregory Poole Equip. Co., 269 Ga. App. 891, 896 (1) (c) (2) (605 SE2d 384) (2004) (limiting the duty to warn under Section 324 (A) in product liability cases to distributors and sellers of dangerous products who are aware that the manufacturer's warnings are inadequate or misleading). Talton has failed to cite to any authority which applies Section 324 (A) to establish a cause of action by a third party against an attorney based upon the attorney's confidential advice to a client. Therefore, we find that this argument lacks merit.
(c) Talton contends that, even if there is no legal basis to find that AGG owed him a duty, we should find such duty based upon public policy. Essentially, he argues that public policy demands that an attorney be held accountable when the attorney gives confidential advice to a client and the client later acts in a manner that harms a third party, regardless of whether the client's actions were consistent with the attorney's advice. This is not, nor has it ever been, the law of Georgia, and we decline Talton's invitation to adopt such a rule. To do otherwise would be to expose attorneys to potentially unlimited liability to third parties who were never their clients and who had no basis upon which to reasonably rely on the attorneys' confidential advice to their clients. See Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 257 Ga. at 133 (finding that a professional who provides information to clients is not liable to third parties whose reliance on the information is merely "foreseeable").
(d) Because Talton has failed to demonstrate that AGG had a duty to warn him of the risks associated with the Cryolife cadaver tissue, Talton's negligence claim must fail as a matter of law. Martha H. West Trust v. Market Value of Atlanta, 262 Ga. App. at 93 (2). The trial court did not err dismissing Talton's suit against AGG.
2. Talton contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint based upon the "learned intermediary" doctrine. Pursuant to our decision in Division 1, supra, this issue is moot.
Judgment affirmed. Smith, P. J., and Adams, J., concur.
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